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I study how structural reforms in product and labor markets
affect an economy that is going through a financial crisis. Of spe-
cific interest is the role of credit intermediation in a crisis and
how it is influenced by reforms. I consider three key character-
istics of the recent financial crisis that are potentially relevant
for policy analysis: First, the crisis was triggered in the finan-
cial sector; second, there were spillovers from the financial to the
real sector due to credit rationing; third, governments actively in-
tervened in the credit market during the crisis. I construct two
dynamic general equilibrium models with financial frictions to ad-
dress these issues—a closed economy model and a monetary union
model. I show that permanent structural reforms have positive
effects on aggregate output in both the long and the short run.
They affect the capital market positively and stimulate credit in-
termediation. Contrariwise, reforms that are either implemented
temporarily or announced to be implemented in the future have
negative consequences for output in the short run. Moreover, re-
forms that are implemented in one country of a currency union
have positive short-run effects on both the reforming country and
its foreign counterpart. My results also hold if the central bank is
constrained by a lower interest rate bound. I also show that re-
forms have a qualitatively similar impact as a direct intervention
in the credit market. Moreover, credit market interventions are
complementary to structural reforms.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Do structural labor and product market reforms in peripheral Europe
depress output in the short run when a financial crisis hits the economy?
This dissertation addresses the question by considering three essential
characteristics of the recent crisis: First, the crisis was triggered in the fi-
nancial markets; second, there were spillovers from the financial sector to
the real economy; third, monetary policy measures were unconventional.
My results favor permanent reforms. The wealth effect associated with
reforms enhances credit intermediation and mitigates the contraction of
economic activity.
When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, the global financial system
began to struggle. Interbank lending froze, resulting in a slow-down of
the real economy worldwide. A sovereign debt crisis followed in the
European Monetary Union. Politicians and economists alike have since
been debating about the appropriate policies to adopt. One suggestion
is to reduce macroeconomic imbalances within member states. Although
differences in the ability to compete have been documented (see, e.g.,
Dieppe et al., 2012), there is dissent on the effectiveness of structural
policies in a crisis scenario, particularly when interest rates are close to
zero.
The main argument in favor of structural reforms is that they initi-
ate a wealth effect. Shifts in the long-run aggregate supply are associ-
ated with increases in expected future income that immediately stimu-
late demand and lead to output growth (see, e.g., Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2014)). In the context of a mon-
etary union, reforms in less competitive member states can lead to real
devaluations relative to the rest of the union. In addition to wealth
effects, there are changes in terms of trade, encouraging households to
substitute in favor of the reforming countries (see, e.g., Farhi, Gopinath,
and Itskhoki, 2014).
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However, reforms might have negative implications for output growth
in the short run. In a recent paper, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014)
show that if the nominal interest rate is at a lower bound, deflationary
pressures resulting from reforms can cause the real interest rate to appre-
ciate. The higher real interest rate induces households to reduce current
consumption in favor of future consumption, leading to a further con-
traction of economic activity in the short run.
The recent literature on structural reforms has discovered that stan-
dard transmission channels of specific policy initiatives may be distorted
in special situations. For this purpose, the crisis scenario itself was often
considered in the analysis of reforms. However, the fact that the re-
cent crisis was financial in its nature has generally been ignored. In the
following, I address three issues that are potentially relevant for policy
analysis.
First, the crisis originated in the financial sector of the economy. After
a long period of growth, asset prices in the housing and mortgage market
in the United States suddenly began to decline by the end of 2006. In
turn, falling asset prices deteriorated the balance sheets of some major
financial institutions, including Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and Lehman Brothers. Ultimately, an asymmetric information problem
appeared in the interbank market: The fact that any borrower in the
market was potentially linked to a struggling financial institution induced
a vicious circle that drastically slowed down interbank lending. Many
existing models used to study reforms omit these dynamics. Instead,
they focus on the outcomes of the crisis, such as a contraction of output,
deflation, and the fact that interest rates are close to the zero lower
bound. For example, a standard procedure to initiate a crisis in a model
is to induce a shock to the preference structure of households which leads
to a reduction in consumption demand. It is, however, questionable if
preference shocks are appropriate for modeling debt related crisis (see,
e.g., Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012).
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Second, there is a fundamental link between the financial and the
real sector. The fact that interbank lending slows down is by itself not
alarming. However, in the recent crisis, the distortions in the financial
sector swapped over to the real economy. Financial intermediaries re-
stricted lending to firms in the real sector drastically. The depletion of
credit supply became apparent in substantially increasing credit spreads.
The increased costs of borrowing in turn affected the profits of firms and
thus their asset prices. Ultimately, the drop in real sector asset prices
fed back to the financial sector, further eroding financial intermediaries’
ability to carry out their main function. Such an amplification is known
as financial acceleration. Although there is seminal research on the inter-
action between the financial and the real sector1, showing that worsening
conditions in the process of credit intermediation have substantial conse-
quences for the real sector, much of the literature on structural reforms
ignores the financial sector.
Third, governments intervened in the credit markets during the finan-
cial crisis. Large scale asset purchasing programs were initiated in the
United States and Europe with the purpose of restoring the functioning
of the financial markets. Thus, governments stepped in as lenders of last
resort to relax the credit constraints which hampered the flow of funds
from capital suppliers to goods producing firms. The previous literature
on reforms rarely takes this behavior into account. Instead, monetary
policy is assumed to rely on the nominal interest rate in order to react to
crisis. Therefore, the constraint imposed on the monetary authority by
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates was of primary interest
in many studies.
The main contribution of this dissertation consists in addressing these
1See, e.g., Bernanke (1981, 1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009),
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014). I will review the literature in detail in Section 2.1.
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issues when studying the effects of structural reforms in a crisis scenario.
The model I construct builds on the standard monetary New-Keynesian
dynamic equilibrium framework (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003,
2007; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005). The core element of
the model is the financial sector which channels capital from households
to firms. Credit constraints arise endogenously from a moral hazard
problem following Gertler and Karadi (2011). Financial intermediaries’
leverage is therefore an important state variable in the model. Eventually,
shocks are accelerated in the capital markets. The model incorporates
asset prices and credit spreads. The dynamical behavior of these vari-
ables in response to structural reforms provides insights into how these
policies influence credit intermediation. Prices and wages are sticky and
hence money plays a role in the model. I consider different types of mon-
etary policy rules. These include Taylor rules in which a constraint on
the lower level of the nominal interest rate is imposed, as well as uncon-
ventional monetary policy rules as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). Specific
characteristics of the European Monetary Union are modeled following
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014). Reforms are modeled as reduc-
tions in taxes on wages and retail prices, which increase competition in
the labor and product markets, respectively.
I deviate from the previous literature in various aspects. In contrast
to Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2014),
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014), and Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi
(2016), I consider investment in physical capital. In contrast to Eggerts-
son, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014), Gerali, Notarpietro, and Pisani (2015a,b),
Vogel (2016), Gomes (2014), and Anderson, Hunt, and Snudden (2014),
I do not model the crisis as originating from a shock to demand. Instead,
the starting point of my analysis is a shock in the financial market that
leads to a credit crunch as in Andre´s, Arce, and Thomas (2014). The
major distinction from Andre´s, Arce, and Thomas (2014) is the modeling
of leverage and credit market frictions. In contrast to Anderson, Hunt,
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and Snudden (2014), who intend to capture unconventional monetary
policy by relaxing the zero lower bound constraint, I explicitly account
for direct interventions in the credit market while keeping the interest
rate constraint.
My analysis reveals that the financial sector plays an important role
in the way structural reforms affect the economy. The following scenario
illustrates the main mechanisms: Financial intermediaries borrow funds
at fixed interest from households. They invest these funds and their own
equity in the capital stock. Hence, they hold a leveraged position. A
moral hazard problem imposes a constraint on leverage. Assume that
a financial market shock lets asset prices drop sharply. As a result, the
net worth of financial intermediaries falls and balance sheets of banks
deteriorate. Bankers’ debt-to-equity ratios increase substantially, tight-
ening the credit constraint and letting credit spreads increase accordingly.
Households respond by reducing the amount of funds supplied to bankers.
Consequently, the supply of credit to goods producing firms declines, and
so does production. In sum, the initial disturbance is accelerated in the
financial market and ultimately the real sector is driven into a recession.
My study shows that in this setting reforms aimed at reducing the
cost of labor or the monopoly power of firms are effective in reducing
the multiplicative effects in the credit intermediation process. Expec-
tations of higher future income and production volume are immediately
reflected in the financial market. Asset prices increase and credit spreads
adjust. Balance sheets in the financial sector recover and debt-to-equity
ratios decrease. The moral hazard constraint is relaxed. Households’
capital supply increases, facilitating production and mitigating the re-
cession. The wealth effect works, no matter whether the central bank is
facing a lower bound on interest rates or not. Moreover, unconventional
policy measures that stimulate credit intermediation are not in conflict
with structural reforms. Thus, my model suggests that reforms are an
appropriate measure to combat economic contraction in a financial crisis.
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The structure of this dissertation is as follows. The next section re-
views the literature related to the research question. First, I introduce
the foundations, modeling, and implications of financial acceleration be-
cause it is the central element of the model which I will use to analyze
reforms. Second, I describe why reforms are on the academic and political
agenda. Reviewing evidence on the accumulation of current account im-
balances within European countries, I explain why the present situation
was deemed unsustainable and why optimum currency theory suggests
that structural reforms may help restoring balance in Europe. Third, I
present research on reforms in product and labor markets. I show how
such reforms are typically modeled in theory and how reforms affect an
economy in the short and long run. The final section of the literature
review is devoted to research that studies reforms in crisis scenarios.
I then proceed to study structural reforms in a financial crisis. I begin
by looking at a closed economy in sections 3 and 4. I introduce a New-
Keynesian monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that
is closely related to that of Gertler and Karadi (2011). The purpose of
studying a closed economy first is to reduce complexity and to introduce
the most relevant model features in a parsimonious way. I describe the
crisis as arising from the financial sector and focus on the way reforms
affect the economy in such scenario.
In sections 5 and 6, I assess structural reforms in the context of the
European Monetary Union. Therefore, I extend the model to a two-area
economy where both areas share the same currency. The monetary union
model builds to a large extent on the setup of Eggertsson, Ferrero, and
Raffo (2014). When modeling the capital markets, I again make use of the
framework developed by Gertler and Karadi (2011). In the initial state,
the model is characterized by asymmetries between the European areas.
The regions differ with respect to the degree of competition in product
and labor markets. I then go on to study how structural policies that
reduce these imbalances affect the economies of the core and periphery
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countries as well as the monetary union. Moreover, I study the impact
of reforms when monetary policy is unconventional.




Structural reforms in product and labor markets are a controversial topic
in the European Monetary Union, particularly in the aftermath of the
financial crisis. The first subsection of this short review is devoted to the
financial aspects of the crisis. I introduce credit frictions and financial
acceleration because these are the key elements for both the motivation
for my study and the theoretical models that I use for the analysis. I
then describe why structural reforms are on the agenda and what is the
reasoning behind the idea of implementing reforms, in normal as well
as special situations. The second subsection outlines the main ideas of
the optimum currency area theory and how they relate to the present
discussion. Of special interest is the question if a lack of an appropriate
shock adjustment mechanism in the European Monetary Union has led
to the accumulation of imbalances. The third subsection focuses on the
theoretical modeling of structural reforms. The final subsection deals
with the adoption of structural reforms in a crisis scenario.
2.1 Credit Constraints and Financial Acceleration
Financial acceleration refers to a macroeconomic concept that empha-
sizes the relevance of financial frictions for the transmission of economic
shocks. In fact, besides depressing real economic variables, an adverse
shock may also deteriorate the functioning of the financial sector, which,
in turn, amplifies the impact on real variables.
Although the simultaneous appearance of distressed financial markets
and economic downturns, especially during the Great Depression in the
1930s, was well acknowledged, neither classical or Keynesian economists,
nor monetarists devoted much attention to the link between the func-
tioning of the financial system and real economic activity until the ’80s.
Instead, liquidity preference theory, fiscal multiplication mechanisms,
business cycle theory, and the econometric evaluation of the relationship
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between money and output were high on the agenda of macroeconomists.
One view was that the financial sector was merely a mirror of real
economic activity and thus needed no special attention. Contrasting
approaches considered the impact of a distorted financial system on the
supply of money and emphasized adverse effects on real economic activity
when money is non-neutral. That is, money as opposed to credit was
considered the relevant financial aggregate (see, e.g., Gertler, 1988).
According to Bernanke (1983), however, financial sector distortions
play a major role in the explanation of the Great Depression in the United
States. He argues as follows. Bank defaults, which are for example caused
by bank runs, reduce the efficiency of the financial sector and disturb the
process of credit intermediation. Sectors that heavily rely on credit inter-
mediation eventually find it difficult to get access to capital. Ultimately,
their ability to operate their business erodes, and their capacity to repay
debts decreases, which in turn diminishes their access to credit even fur-
ther. Bernanke also supports his argument by showing empirically that
financial variables are important determinants, relative to monetary ag-
gregates, in explaining the Great Depression.
Overall, Bernanke (1983) highlights some important points. First,
monetary aggregates fail to explain the magnitude of the variations of
real variables, in particular output. Second, theories focusing on the
non-neutrality of money are inappropriate when explaining persistent
deviations of output. Finally, the author emphasizes the rationality as-
sumption for research on the relationship between real and financial vari-
ables.
While taking into account that participants in the financial market
behave rationally, microeconomic research explored in greater detail the
frictions underlying the credit intermediation process. In particular,
economists addressed that borrowers typically have more information
about their own financial condition than lenders. Such an information
asymmetry was shown to have substantial implications for the function-
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ing of capital markets.
One prominent approach to studying the effects of asymmetric infor-
mation on financial contracts is based on the so-called lemons problem
(Akerlof, 1970). The main idea is as follows. It is assumed that lenders
cannot, or at least not fully, observe some measure of quality of borrow-
ers ex ante. The quality measure is usually related to the willingness or
ability of the borrower to repay debt. Ultimately, the lender must eval-
uate the likelihood of default given limited information. For example, in
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) lenders cannot observe the riskiness of borrow-
ers’ projects, while in Jaffee and Russell (1976) lenders cannot observe
the honesty of borrowers. Myers and Majluf (1984) consider information
asymmetries between management or existing shareholders of a firm and
potential new shareholders. In particular, if management has more in-
formation with respect to the firm value, it may be optimal for them to
cheat external financiers in favor of existing shareholders. Consequently,
lenders may treat the issuance of new shares as a negative signal (see,
e.g., Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984).
The literature on lemon problems provides several important insights.
First, the optimal behavior of lenders when information is distributed
asymmetrically can involve adverse selection. In other words, lenders
treat all borrowers as average. As a consequence, low-quality borrowers
benefit at the expense of high-quality borrowers. Second, there is some
form of credit rationing. For example, lenders may reduce the amount of
credit to borrowers to increase the ratio of collateral to debt. Alterna-
tively, some borrowers may not be given credit at all. Third, borrowers
prefer internal over external funding, because internal funding does not
typically involve information asymmetries. Fourth, lending will be highly
sensitive to changes in the interest rate if the interest rate feeds back to
the quality of borrowers (see, e.g., Mankiw, 1986).
Other prominent approaches to information asymmetries are based
on the costly state verification framework (see Townsend, 1979; Gale and
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Hellwig, 1985; Williamson, 1987). One major advantage of this over the
lemons approach is that the form of the financing contract is not imposed
exogenously but emerges endogenously in the model.
The structure of the model is as follows. An entrepreneur aims at
investing in a project with uncertain return and requires some financ-
ing in addition to its equity. Information is asymmetrically distributed
because only the entrepreneur can observe the project’s return ex post.
The lender can, however, audit the borrower at a cost, thereby reduc-
ing the information asymmetry. The entrepreneur has limited liability.
Hence, its payoff is at least zero. Given that the lender cannot observe
the project return, there is an incentive for the entrepreneur to cheat
the lender by misrepresenting the return in order to increase its own re-
turn. Moreover, if the entrepreneur’s payoff is negative, he will maximize
profits by declaring bankruptcy.
The optimal financing contract in this framework will have the fol-
lowing characteristics. First, it will encourage the entrepreneur not to
understate project returns. The contract therefore involves that the bor-
rower will audit in case of bankruptcy but will accept a fixed return in the
no-default case. Second, the expected monitoring cost will be minimized.
This framework has several implications. First, there will be a pre-
mium on external finance to compensate the lender for the expected
cost of bankruptcy. Such premium is often referred to as an external
finance premium or a lemons premium. Second, asymmetric informa-
tion increases the marginal cost of capital. Hence, firms will demand
less financing and invest less if the problem is worse (see, e.g., Gale and
Hellwig, 1985). Third, credit rationing can appear even in the absence
of adverse selection or moral hazard (Williamson, 1987). Fourth, the
premium on external finance is inversely related to the net worth of the
borrower. Consequently, borrowers’ balance sheets, and particularly the
degree of leverage, become a relevant determinant for aggregate invest-
ment activity (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). This also suggests
11
that there is a relation of financing cost, leverage, and investment activ-
ity over the business cycle. In fact, if balance sheets are assumed to be
stronger in upturns, leverage and external finance premium will be lower,
which in turn stimulates investment.2 Overall, asymmetric information
suggests that financial structure is relevant and that the Modigliani and
Miller (1958) theorem does not hold.
The macroeconomic literature adopted the asymmetric information
frameworks in order to study the qualitative and quantitative implica-
tions of financial frictions for the dynamic behavior of real variables. One
of the dominant research questions was whether these frictions could help
explain the intensity and persistence of the response of macroeconomic
variables to shocks. Closely related is the question whether the new in-
sights give rise to new transmission channels of monetary policy. The
idea is that monetary policy does not only affect market interest rates,
but also directly and indirectly affects borrowers’ balance sheets (balance
sheet channel) and the supply of loans by banks (bank lending channel).
These channels are commonly referred to as the credit channel (see, e.g.,
Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995; Mishkin, 1996).
One of the first attempts to study how financial factors affect real vari-
ables over the business cycle in a dynamic setting was made by Bernanke
and Gertler (1989). Their starting point is an overlapping generations
model that, in the case of perfect markets, has similar features to the
neoclassical real business cycle model. They incorporate asymmetric in-
formation between lenders and entrepreneurs into the model by means
of a costly state verification framework. The key feature of the model
is that entrepreneurs’ balance sheets are relevant for the cost of exter-
nal financing. Specifically, borrower net worth is inversely related to the
2These implications may be challenged on empirical grounds. During the upswing
period preceding the financial crisis, for example, leverage increased. Models that try
to capture this feature will be discussed further below.
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agency cost of financing investments. The authors show that changes in
borrower net worth have substantial implications for output fluctuations.
A positive productivity shock, for example, increases the income of en-
trepreneurs, improves their balance sheets, thereby relaxing borrowing
constraints and decreasing the cost of external capital. This encourages
investment, which ultimately amplifies the boom. This mechanism is
often referred to as an income-accelerator on investment.
Their model also shows that the accelerating effects are highly non-
linear. If, for example, borrower net worth is high in upturns, external
finance will be less relevant and changes in cash flows will have minor
consequences for investment. To the contrary, fluctuations in cash flows
have great significance when internal finance is low. Another implication
is that, in case there is a safe asset, lenders will choose to increase the
share of investments in safe assets if the costs of monitoring is high. Thus,
the model suggests that there is flight-to-quality in recessions (Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996).
One drawback of the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) model is that the
overlapping generations framework restricts the duration of credit con-
tracts to single periods. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) consider long-
lived entrepreneurs instead. They incorporate the main mechanism of
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) into a standard real business cycle model
and evaluate the model quantitatively. The main advantage of their
model is that it can replicate the hump-shaped response of output to a
productivity shock. The result appears because an increase in produc-
tivity increases the return on internal capital and thus leads to a redis-
tribution of wealth from households to entrepreneurs. The improvement
in net worth is anticipated by households. Consequently, households ex-
pect the agency cost to diminish gradually when net worth increases and
it is optimal to postpone investment. Overall, their results stress the
importance of borrower’s net worth as a state variable.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) construct an alternative model with credit
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constraints to study the business cycle. Their key innovation is a mecha-
nism that emphasizes asset prices, as opposed to cash flow, as the central
variable in the accelerator process. The model distinguishes between con-
strained and unconstrained borrowers. Capital, which is thought of as
land, has two functions. First, it is used as a production factor. Second,
it is used as collateral for loans. Lenders can only force borrowers to
repay loans that are secured so that eventually the price of land deter-
mines borrowers’ credit limits. The constrained firms are assumed to be
leveraged. If a productivity shock occurs, constrained firms will experi-
ence worsening net worth and will not be able to borrow more. Instead,
they must reduce their demand for land in subsequent periods. How-
ever, land is in fixed supply. Unconstrained firms must therefore absorb
the demand, which, in equilibrium, requires that the price of land drops.
The decrease in asset prices further deteriorates net worth of constrained
borrowers. Hence, there is acceleration.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) construct what would become
the workhorse model of the financial accelerator literature. According to
the authors, it is a synthesis of the leading approaches in the literature.
The key features are the following. First, it is a dynamic general equilib-
rium model. Second, the model incorporates monopolistic competition
and price stickiness. Third, there is money. Hence, monetary policy plays
a role in the model. Fourth, there are decision lags in investment that
can generate the hump-shaped response of output as in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997). Fifth, firms are heterogeneous with respect to their access
to capital markets. Sixth, there are non-linear capital adjustment costs,
leading to violations of Tobin’s q3. In other words, the market value of
a firm can differ from its reproduction value. Finally, there is a financial
accelerator that combines elements of both Bernanke and Gertler (1989)




One of the main advantages of the model is that it allows for the
analysis of the transmission of monetary policy in the presence of credit
market frictions. The authors study, for example, how an unanticipated
change in the interest rate affects real variables. They show that real vari-
ables, particularly investment and output, react stronger to the monetary
policy shock when there are frictions in credit markets. Moreover, the
response of real variables is more persistent. A decline in the interest
rate increases the demand for capital, stimulates investment, and leads
to rising asset prices. Thus, net worth of entrepreneurs increases, and
the external finance premium declines. In turn, investment is further
stimulated. Hence, there is a multiplication process at work.
Iacoviello (2005) constructs a New-Keynesian monetary model with
credit constraints similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), in which en-
trepreneurs and households face borrowing constraints. Firms can use
real estate as collateral. A subset of impatient households is constrained
in taking on nominal debt. The main implication of the model is that
demand shocks are financially accelerated but supply shocks are deceler-
ated. A positive demand shock increases housing prices, thereby relax-
ing entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints and encouraging investment. In
addition, because consumer prices rise, the real value of debt decreases,
encouraging impatient households to consume more. On the contrary,
a positive supply shock increases asset prices but decreases consumer
prices, and consequently the real value of debt increases. It follows from
this asymmetry that a Taylor rule monetary policy that assigns a high
weight to inflation can better offset supply shocks.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) study monetary policy in greater
detail using a financial accelerator model. The structure of the banking
sector is much richer than in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
In particular, the authors incorporate a production function for loans
that depends on loan monitoring and collateral. Loan monitoring re-
quires labor, while collateral can take the form of physical capital and
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bonds, the latter being more efficient. Financial acceleration works in
the conventional way. A positive monetary stimulus raises the demand
for capital, increases asset prices, increases borrowers’ net worth, and
reduces the external finance premium. In addition, there is an effect that
works in the opposite direction. Specifically, the same monetary stimulus
increases the demand for bank deposits, which are required to facilitate
transactions. This effect is referred to as banking attenuator.
A unique feature of the model is that it facilitates the derivation of
five different interest rates: a collateralized and a uncollateralized loan
rate, the government bond rate, the marginal product of capital, and
an intertemporal shadow rate.4 Based on the model, the authors pro-
vide several insights. First, the steady-state premium on capital over
the government bond is substantial. Hence, the structure of the banking
sector can help explain the equity premium puzzle. Second, the exter-
nal finance premium does not necessarily move counter-cyclically. Third,
monetary policy may have unintended consequences if the central bank
fails to appropriately account for the differences in interest rates. Specif-
ically, the central bank may implement the right strategy with the wrong
instrument.
Instead of studying the effects of standard shocks to the economy,
such as productivity shocks or monetary policy shocks, a growing number
of studies consider shocks that are specific to the financial sector. An
example is Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Their model distinguishes
between equity and debt financing. The constraints on debt are modeled
in the usual fashion—that is, higher debt reduces the supply of funds from
lenders while the value of collateral works in the opposite direction. With
respect to equity, the authors assume that internal financing of firms is
not limited to their profit. Instead, they can issue new equity shares at
some cost. For example, a shock that induces a change in the capital
4The shadow rate serves as a benchmark and is derived from a fictitious default-free
security that, in contrast to the government bond, cannot be used as collateral.
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structure of the firm would, without the ability to issue shares, require
the liquidation of assets, which would depress asset prices. If, however,
the firm is able to adjust its capital structure by issuing shares, this
effect would be dampened. Therefore, the model’s structure highlights
that the way financial shocks affect macroeconomic variables depends
critically on the ability and speed at which firms can switch between
equity and debt. The more rigid or costly the adjustment, the stronger
the effects of financial shocks on the production of firms.
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) include stochastic volatility
of the effectiveness of capital into a financial accelerator model to study
how a shock to uncertainty, i.e. a risk shock, affects the dynamical be-
havior of macroeconomic variables. In the model, each entrepreneur is
subject to an idiosyncratic shock that determines how efficient capital
can be used. This reflects that capital can potentially be more successful
in one firm as opposed to another. The extent of dispersion across en-
trepreneurs is, however, non-constant and varies over time. The model
implies that credit spreads increase in response to increasing risk. Based
on their model, the authors show that risk shocks are important deter-
minants of business cycles.
Bigio (2015) also considers heterogeneity in capital quality as a source
business fluctuations. As per the model, entrepreneurs may default on
wage payments to workers, in which case workers divert a fraction of
output. The entrepreneur can ease the problem by making upfront wage
payments. To do so, the entrepreneur needs liquidity, which requires the
sale or collateralization of capital. Capital quality is heterogeneous and
the quality of a unit of capital cannot be observed by the buyer. This
information asymmetry makes liquidity costly. A shock to the disper-
sion of quality makes liquidity costlier, which, in turn, tightens the labor
market constraints. Hence, financial frictions have real effects. The key
insight is that liquidity can drop due to increasing capital quality disper-
sion, thereby causing a recession even though there is no change in the
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productive capacity of the economy.
Many business cycle models that incorporate financial acceleration
build on the assumption that non-financial firms face credit constraints.
In contrast, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011)
assume that financial intermediaries are not solely a veil to channel funds
from households to firms. Instead, they consider that financial interme-
diaries are themselves constrained in their ability to obtain funds. The
credit constraints arise from a moral hazard problem between house-
holds and banks that affects the flow of funds between the suppliers and
lenders of capital. Shocks that affect bank balance sheets are eventually
accelerated.5 The authors use the model to study unconventional policy
measures by the central bank. Specifically, the central bank directly in-
tervenes in the credit market when a crisis occurs, in order to relax the
balance sheet constraints in the sector. The policy relies on the assump-
tion that governments, as opposed to private banks, are not constrained
by moral hazard and can therefore elastically issue risk-free debt. If the
condition holds, government intervention can reduce the magnitude and
persistence of a financial crisis substantially.
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) relax the assumption that fi-
nancial intermediaries only rely on short-term debt to finance investments
in the capital stock. Banks can issue outside equity, or alternatively sub-
ordinated debt, in addition to accepting deposits and therefore have a
choice as to how vulnerable they are to macroeconomic shocks. The
motivation for issuing equity is that it serves as a hedge against fluctu-
ations in net worth. However, having more equity finance makes moral
hazard more severe in their model. The optimal capital structure ulti-
mately depends on the perceptions of fundamental risk in the economy.
In particular, less fundamental risk justifies higher leverage. Moreover,
the model implies that expectations of government interventions in a cri-
sis scenario increase financial intermediaries’ optimal leverage. Thus, a
5I will explain this model in greater detail in the following sections.
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highly leveraged financial sector, as was for example observed before the
financial crisis, potentially reflects financial intermediaries’ expectations
of government interventions in case a crisis occurs.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2016) construct a model in which a financially accelerated recession
opens up the possibility for bank runs. The main idea is that due to
liquidity mismatch in the financial sector, a bank run is generally possi-
ble (see also Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Cole and Kehoe, 2000). Bank
liabilities can be withdrawn at any time, whereas bank assets have long
maturities and are not perfectly liquid. Hence, if all depositors withdraw
their funds at once, the bank will collapse, which is a reason for depos-
itors to do so. In the model, households can choose to run a bank in
each period. If they run and the banks are not able to repay deposits,
the banking system will collapse. If this happens, households will have
to invest directly into the capital stock, which is less efficient. Thus,
households will not run as long as the liquidation value exceeds the value
of deposits. An economic shock that accelerates in the financial market
may not allow this condition to hold, implying the possibility of bank
runs. If it is assumed that the probability of a bank run depends on
the strength of the violation of this condition, an additional amplifica-
tion mechanism for shocks appears. The anticipation of a bank run will
therefore be harmful for an economy, even if it does not occur.
Traditional models of the financial accelerator have focused on model-
ing the amplification of shocks and the persistence of the crisis that arises
subsequently. The economy is typically assumed to be in the steady state
when the triggering shock occurs. A relatively new area of the literature
explores whether an economy is more vulnerable to shocks in some states
of the world than in others. The main idea is that although there are
constraints in the financial market, they only occasionally bind, and con-
sequently amplification effects are state dependent and highly non-linear.
Mendoza (2010) studies if credit frictions can explain sudden stops
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in capital flows to emerging market countries. He constructs a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium of a small open economy with two special
features of the credit market. First, firms require external finance to
fund their working capital. Second, long-term debt as well as working
capital loans cannot exceed a fraction of the market value of the physical
capital that serves as collateral. From this setup emerges a ceiling on
the leverage ratio of firms. As in other models of the financial accelera-
tor, leverage amplifies the effect of shocks on macroeconomic variables in
an asymmetric way. However, as net exports are countercyclical in the
model, leverage grows in times when the emerging economy expands and
may ultimately hit the ceiling. Once leverage is at its maximum, shocks
lead to fire sales of assets which by itself enforces the constraint. Ulti-
mately, investment and consumption decline and capital flows reverse.
Therefore, the model can capture a sudden downturn after a period of
sustained expansion.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) study financial frictions in a con-
tinuous time economy. In their model, there are experts and households
that differ in their productivity in managing capital. For any given dis-
tribution of wealth, it would be optimal if experts would manage all the
capital. Experts are, however, constrained in their ability to issue equity
to households. Instead, they can only issue risk-free debt. It is assumed
that households invest a fraction of their assets in a risk-free asset so that
experts can be leveraged. Eventually, the determining variable in the
model is the distribution of wealth between experts and less-productive
households. Particularly, when experts’ share of wealth increases, as-
set prices increase and leverage and risk premia decrease. One of the
authors’ main insights from this model is that amplification is highly
non-linear. They show that near the steady state amplification is low or
even zero; however, if the experts’ share of capital is low, the acceleration
mechanism becomes substantially stronger. Hence, an economy may oc-
casionally switch to a crisis regime due to shocks. Once in that regime,
20
even small shocks can have large consequences. Moreover, the economy
may be stuck in this regime for an extended period. Interestingly, this
endogenous, state-dependent risk is rarely determined by fundamental
risk. Rather, it is determined by the liquidity of capital, i.e. the fric-
tions in the capital market. Moreover, amplification is asymmetric in the
sense that amplification of positive shocks is small. Another interesting
result is that financial innovations, although they reduce idiosyncratic
risk, encourage higher leverage which increases systemic risk.
He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) also consider a continuous time
model in which specialists accept money from households and invest in a
risky asset. Specialists can issue equity to households, but due to a moral
hazard problem, the optimal equity contract implies a ceiling on the
equity holdings of households. Specifically, the maximum equity holding
is a fraction of specialists’ wealth. Some characteristics of the model are
similar to those of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). In particular, the
amplification of shocks is small in normal times but becomes large when
the financial constraints are binding. In contrast to Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014), however, recovery from the crisis regime is faster.
The recent financial crisis followed a boom period that involved sub-
stantial credit expansion. This evolution can be explained by occasional
financial market runs as described by Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016).
The centerpiece of their model is a financial sector with heterogeneous
banks which differ with respect to their intermediation efficiency. Banks
receive deposits from households and can also borrow from other banks.
There is asymmetric information in the sense that lenders cannot observe
or verify the efficiencies of other banks. There is also moral hazard in
the banking market. In precise terms, borrowing banks can at some cost
divert funds, which cannot be recovered by lenders. There are four differ-
ent return rates: An inefficient storage rate, the deposit rate, interbank
rate, and the return on firm loans. The structure implies that inefficient
banks will lend to efficient banks. If the interbank rate is high relative to
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the loan rate, the cutoff efficiency to borrow will be high. Moral hazard
imposes a limit on the borrowing capacity of the interbank market. In
other words, the demand for funds is not strictly decreasing in the in-
terbank rate because, at small rates, the market is more selective when
choosing borrowers to prevent moral hazard. A market breakdown can
appear in the model when the supply of funds exceeds the absorption
capacity of the banking market. This can happen either due to the over-
accumulation of assets by households, i.e. from the supply side, or due
to an adverse productivity shock that reduces demand. The key point
is, however, that a sequence of positive productivity shocks drives down
interest rates, making the economy more vulnerable to shocks. In such
a situation, small negative impulses to productivity can cause a collapse
of the interbank market, resulting in severe recession. Thus, the model
offers an explanation for the appearance of a sudden banking crisis in a
credit-intensive boom.
The literature on credit frictions and financial acceleration is large
and fast-growing. The key results of my short review are summarized
as follows: The financial accelerator literature initially tried to explain
why small shocks can have a large and persistent effect on macroeco-
nomic variables. The explanation is based on frictions in the process of
credit intermediation, which stem from asymmetric information or moral
hazard between borrowers and lenders. One way to overcome incentive
problems in financial contracts is monitoring which typically brings up
the borrower’s collateral, net worth, or leverage as a state variable. This
implies that financial structure is relevant. Credit supply and capital
returns thus depend on the borrowers’ balance sheets, which themselves
depend on asset prices. Hence, there is feedback from financial to real
variables. A shock that changes, for example, asset prices is therefore
accelerated in the credit market.
Eventually, the financial accelerator mechanism found its way into
real business cycles models, dynamic New-Keynesian models, and mon-
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etary models in order to explain several empirical observations includ-
ing the size and persistence of macroeconomic variations in response to
shocks, the flight-to-quality in recessions, and the hump-shaped response
of output to productivity shocks.
The literature also gives insights into monetary policy. With credit
frictions, the choice of inflation and output weights in a Taylor rule im-
plicitly determines whether a central bank is better suited to react to
supply or demand shocks. It is also relevant which particular interest
rate the central bank targets. Different interest rates have different op-
timal rules. In a financial crisis, government intervention in the credit
market can help to mitigate the crisis by encouraging credit flow. How-
ever, expected government intervention may also worsen moral hazard in
the financial sector.
Financial shocks, risk shocks, and shocks to expected future market
conditions are also important sources of business-cycle fluctuations. A
change in the dispersion of a financial variable can induce a contraction
of real economic variables, although there is no fundamental change in
the productive capacity of an economy. Moreover, the anticipation of a
bank run can harm an economy, even though a bank run never appears.
Moreover, an economy’s ability to quickly and inexpensively adjust the
aggregate capital structure is a major determinant of its vulnerability to
financial shocks.
According to recent research, financial acceleration is highly non-
linear and thus economies may be prone to instability. Amplification
of positive shocks is minor, but amplification of negative shocks is sub-
stantial. Economies occasionally switch to different regimes, resulting in
sudden and substantial changes in real variables. A financial crisis can be
preceded by a long period of expansion and be triggered by small shocks.
This review describes the emergence and development of the financial
accelerator literature. Although it is far from complete, it attempts to
cover the most relevant contributions in this fields. More comprehensive
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reviews are, for example, provided by Gertler (1988) or, more recently,
Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012).
One of the main contributions of my study is that it takes credit fric-
tions and financial acceleration into account in the evaluation of struc-
tural reforms. I will construct a scenario of a crisis which is driven by a
financial shock and I will show how reforms affect asset prices and credit
intermediation.
The following sections of this literature review explain the context of
the recent discussion of reforms in the European Monetary Union and
present how, from a theoretical perspective, reforms affect an economy
in normal times and in a financial crisis.
2.2 Imbalances in the European Monetary Union
In a currency union, all member states agree to share one single currency
as the official medium of exchange. A common currency reduces trans-
action costs and exchange rate uncertainty, thereby leading to greater
competition due to reduced price distortions and increased transparency.
Therefore, trade is expected to increase substantially among the member
states of a currency union (see, e.g., Rose, 2000; Rose and van Wincoop,
2001; Glick and Rose, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002). Besides trade, there
are other advantages of a fixed exchange rate, such as the disciplining of
policymakers or the import of monetary policy credibility (see, e.g., Gi-
avazzi and Pagano, 1988; Giavazzi, 1988; Herrendorf, 1997; Alesina and
Barro, 2002).
Provided that capital can flow freely, all member states have to re-
linquish their independence with regard to monetary policy and devote
monetary decision-making to a common authority. The discussion of the
economic drawbacks of sharing a currency is built around the question,
how an economy adapts to asymmetric shocks6 if exchange rates cannot
6Asymmetric shocks have different magnitudes in each country. Alternatively, a
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adjust, and a single monetary authority has to cope with different or
even inverse economic developments in different areas.7
Consider, for example, a positive shock to aggregate domestic de-
mand in a simple two-country economy model with rigid prices, static
expectations, free capital flow, and a flexible exchange rate (see Mundell,
1963; Fleming, 1962). The shock initially increases both the output and
demand for domestic currency. Capital imports increase, leading to an
appreciation of the domestic currency. The reduction in net exports lets
output finally converge back to its natural level. The dynamics would be
different if the exchange rate was fixed. In that case, upward pressure on
the domestic currency would require central bank intervention to absorb
the shock. Finally, if there is only one currency, an asymmetric shock
may, from the perspective of both countries, require conflicting policy
initiatives. If, for example, a share of goods is not tradable internation-
ally, the degree of upward price pressure and the optimal monetary policy
response will not necessarily be identical in both countries.
Optimal currency area theory addresses the question if a set of coun-
tries should abandon flexible exchange rates, taking into account the
costs and benefits of doing so. The early literature on optimal currency
areas proposed the following characteristics to help the currency union’s
member countries make smooth adjustments to asymmetric shocks. Ac-
cording to Mundell (1961), mobility of production factors, in particular
labor, is an important characteristic. The idea is simple: Given a nega-
tive shock in one country, workers can move to a different country and
avoid unemployment. McKinnon (1963) argues that mobility is impor-
tant not only among regions, but also among industries. He highlights
the openness of the economy, as measured by the ratio of tradables to
non-tradables, as an indicator of how well a fixed exchange rate regime
shock of equal size affects economies differently.
7Note the implicit assumption that monetary policy is at all effective in steering
economic variables. This need not necessarily be the case as will be discussed below.
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works. Kenen (1969) emphasizes product diversification. He argues that
a large number of products make a national economy less vulnerable to id-
iosyncratic shocks. He also stresses that fiscal integration would improve
the adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Given a common fiscal policy,
the government could, for example, redirect spending from prosperous
regions to those that suffer from a shock. Fleming (1971) emphasizes the
similarity of inflation rates as an indicator of how well a currency union
can adjust to asymmetric shocks.
Some major advancements in economic theory, particularly those of
Lucas (1976), Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), and Barro
and Gordon (1983) challenged the traditional view of the optimum cur-
rency area theory. Most of the theoretical models dealing with currency
areas were built around a stable Phillips curve, suggesting that mone-
tary policy is an effective tool in stabilizing an economy. If, however,
individuals form their expectations rationally, the ability of the central
bank in steering an economy might be severely limited. When this is
the case, the cost of losing monetary control when joining a currency
union is minor. Moreover, considering that entering a currency union is
a substantial structural change, i.e. a regime shift, the characteristics de-
scribed by the traditional theory are in fact endogenous (see, e.g., Frankel
and Rose, 1998). Hence, the criteria need not necessarily be fulfilled ex
ante but may instead be the result of entry to the currency union. The
new approach of focusing on endogeneity is often termed the new theory
of optimum currency areas (see, e.g., De Grauwe, 1992; Tavlas, 1993).
Frankel and Rose (1998), for example, argue based on empirical find-
ings that business cycles are more correlated if countries are economically
integrated. Therefore, the fulfillment of optimum currency area criteria
is likely to emerge once a country has entered a currency union. In
contrast, participation in a currency union may also cause the member
states to diverge from each other. Krugman (1993) argues that countries
may specialize over time once they have entered a currency union thus
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becoming more vulnerable to asymmetric, that is region specific, shocks.8
Given that shock absorption is less than perfect, theory suggests that
over time the economies of member states of a currency union diverge
and imbalances accumulate. Numerous empirical studies focusing on the
European Monetary Union confirm such accumulation.
Shortly after the introduction of the euro, Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2002) document a trend of growing current account deficits of some Eu-
ropean countries, particularly Greece and Portugal. They argue that
standard economic theory can well explain this pattern. The idea is that
goods and financial market integration lead to convergence among mem-
ber states, especially with respect to productivity and competitiveness.
This fosters expectations of higher growth in less-advanced countries rel-
ative to more-advanced countries. Thus, the improvement in wealth lets
households save less in those countries with higher growth expectations,
while these countries’ higher expected rates of return encourage the more
advanced countries to invest in the growing countries. This pattern is
often referred to as capital flowing downhill.
In fact, productivity catch-up could be observed at that time (see,
e.g., Gourinchas, 2002). Lane and Pels (2012), in an extension of the
work of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), confirm that prosperous future
expectations are related to the evolution of current accounts. Campa and
Gavilan (2011) report that expectations about future growth increased
in all southern European countries following the introduction of the euro.
Moreover, the flow of capital from more-advanced European countries to
less-advanced countries has been confirmed in the subsequent literature
(see, e.g., Lane, 2010; Schmitz and von Hagen, 2011).
These sustainable imbalances are often referred to as good imbalances
8De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) provide a comprehensive overview of the liter-
ature on endogeneity in the optimum currency area theory, where they cover the
endogeneity of economic and financial integration, the endogeneity of symmetry of
shocks, and the endogeneity of product and labor market flexibility.
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(see Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). The more recent literature
emphasizes, however, that these imbalances may in fact be bad, that is
unsustainable.9
In a comprehensive study, Dieppe et al. (2012) analyze numerous in-
dicators of competitiveness of the euro area countries and how they are
related to external imbalances among these countries. They find that
in Southern European countries the trade balance is related to indica-
tors of competitiveness. Southern countries experienced higher increases
in labor costs while simultaneously productivity growth was lower. In
addition, they document that non-price factors such as regulations, tech-
nological innovation, labor force characteristics, and the general business
environment contribute negatively to the trade balance.
Berger and Nitsch (2014) also document that convergence in terms of
competitiveness did not occur in member states of the currency union. In
contrast, they report a widening of trade imbalances after the introduc-
tion of the euro and argue that this may be a result of a lack of flexibility
of product and labor markets in the periphery. Other papers that relate
imbalances to the poor competitive position of the peripheral member
states of the European Monetary Union are Arghyrou and Chortareas
(2008) and Belke and Dreger (2013).
According to the idea of good imbalances, capital inflows in the pe-
riphery should be used in productive sectors, mostly the tradable goods
sector. However, it seems that the non-tradable sector, especially residen-
tial construction, benefited most from the capital coming from the core
(see, e.g., Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2011; Holinski, Kool, and Muysken,
2012). If capital is directed into inappropriate sectors, there might be
some growth in the short run but eventually the economies will not catch-
up in terms of productivity and competitiveness. Instead, the result of
misguided capital utilization was that prices in the periphery increased
9Eichengreen (2010) points out the difficulty in identifying good and bad imbal-
ances, even ex post.
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substantially. Due to the common currency, inflation differentials be-
tween the core and the periphery could not be absorbed by currency
depreciation. Moreover, as the European Central Bank sets the interest
rate on a union-wide basis, real interest rates were lower in the periphery,
which, in turn, encouraged spending and boosted demand. Therefore,
some authors argue that imbalances are driven by demand, not supply.
For example, Gaulier and Vicard (2012) point out that unit labor costs,
one of the primary indicators of competitiveness, are only weakly corre-
lated with exports. Instead, they argue that a boom in the non-tradable
sector, especially construction, financed by core countries, led to rising
prices in the periphery. Consequently, the demand for imports increased
and at the same time labor costs rose. Therefore, the authors believe that
decreasing competitiveness was the result, not the cause of external im-
balances. Similar arguments are made by Wyplosz (2013), Sanchez and
Varoudakis (2013), Comunale and Hessel (2014), Gabrisch and Staehr
(2015), and Unger (2015).
Chen, Milesi-Ferretti, and Tressel (2013) identify trade shocks origi-
nating outside the euro area, in particular China and Eastern Europe, as
an important driver of current account imbalances. They argue that the
large demand of China was mainly served by Germany and other core
countries, while at the same time countries in the periphery suffered from
increased competition from China and Eastern European countries. The
authors also document capital flows from the core to the periphery. They
point out, however, that investors outside the euro area were primarily
investing in securities originating from the core of Europe.10 The authors
further argue that peripheral Europe, while in need of real exchange rate
depreciation to be able to compete globally, experienced a real exchange
rate appreciation that was driven by nominal exchange rate appreciation
relative to other currencies and excessive intra-European financing.
Whether or not the member states of the European Monetary Union
10See also Hobza and Zeugner (2014).
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were suitable candidates was—and continues to be—a subject of aca-
demic discussion.11 Some of the criteria of the early literature were vio-
lated. However, the picture is less clear when endogeneity is considered.
Krugman (2012) points out that the lack of labor mobility and fiscal in-
tegration played an important role in the accumulation of imbalances.
De Grauwe (2013) argues that the lack of automatic stabilizers, in par-
ticular a fiscal transfer system on a currency union-wide level, is one of
the major design failures of the Eurozone. Moreover, the authors stress
that the role of the banking sector and the central bank’s role as the
lender of the last resort, which have played an important role in the re-
cent European crisis, have mostly been ignored in the early literature on
optimal currency areas.
In summary, traditional optimum currency area theory has estab-
lished various ex ante criteria to be met by candidates for entry into a
fixed exchange rate regime. These include the mobility of production fac-
tors, flexible prices, openness, product diversification, fiscal integration,
and the similarity of inflation rates. The fulfillment of these criteria is as-
sociated with more closely correlated business cycles and will thus make
a currency union less vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. The new opti-
mum currency area theory has challenged this view, arguing that these
criteria are endogenous and may therefore be fulfilled ex post. There
is no consensus on the question if members of the European Monetary
Union are suitable candidates. By now, the literature has documented
the accumulation of imbalances. Most studies suggest that these are
unsustainable. There is evidence that current account imbalances stem
from both supply and demand-driven forces.
How can balance be restored? This question has brought structural
reforms on the political and academic agenda in Europe.
11Mongelli (2008) provides a comprehensive review of the optimum currency area
theory with a focus on the European Monetary Union.
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2.3 Reforms in Product and Labor Markets
In a currency union, exchange rates cannot adjust in response to shocks.
Moreover, monetary policy is designed on a unionwide level. Traditional
optimum currency area theory suggests that prior to entry in a currency
union, potential member states should initiate policies to improve the
criteria as discussed in the last section. By doing so, the business cycles
of the member economies are expected to converge. In other words,
the correlation among countries of real variables and prices supposedly
increases. Similarly, when member economies of a currency union have
diverged and imbalances have accumulated, appropriate policies should
result in a reduction in imbalances and let the economies converge.
The literature proposes a variety of reforms to achieve convergence.
In this section, I will focus on structural reforms in product and labor
markets.12 Such reforms are in general designed to increase competition
in the respective markets by reducing sources of inefficiencies. In the
product market, a reform could, for example, include the reduction in
entry barriers. Examples of labor market reforms are the reduction in
hiring and firing costs, or reduced unemployment benefits.
Many of the modern approaches to model reforms in the product
and labor markets built on the ideas of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
The authors construct a simple two-period general equilibrium model
with monopolistic competition. Firms produce using only labor, and
their number is fixed in the short run but endogenous in the long run.
There are frictions in product and labor markets, which are thought of
as regulation. Workers have bargaining power, and there are firm entry
costs that determine the degree of competition between firms.
Deregulation consists of policies that reduce the monopolistic power
of firms and workers. Product market deregulation decreases the total
12Other reforms include financial, trade, and capital account reforms, as discussed,
for example, in Christiansen, Schindler, and Tressel (2013).
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rents of firms and hence the rents available to workers. The level of labor
market regulation determines how rents are distributed.
The long-run effects of product market deregulation are positive in
their model. Although deregulation reduces the total rent available to
workers, this loss is outweighed by workers’ benefit from increased compe-
tition as consumers. Additionally, labor market deregulation is desirable
in the long run as it leads to higher employment. However, reforms in the
labor market lead to higher unemployment and lower real wages in the
short run. As the number of firms is fixed, lower wages that result from
a loss of bargaining power of workers do not lead to higher employment
but instead increase the rent of firms. In the long run, a higher rent
encourages firm entry and more competition so that workers ultimately
gain.
The authors’ results have received considerable attention as they have
important implications for policy design. If a reform has negative short-
term consequences for some groups or individuals of an economy, there
might be opposition against these policies although the long-run benefits
are positive. The specific degree of market deregulation, the way product
and labor market reforms are combined, as well as the timing of policy
measures can significantly influence their effectiveness.
The subsequent literature on product and labor market regulation
has frequently build on the ideas of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). In
particular, researchers have studied how reforms affect the economy in
models that include more microeconomic details of either product or
labor markets.
For example, Ebell and Haefke (2009) study product market regula-
tion in a dynamic general equilibrium model with individual bargaining
in multi-worker firms. They highlight two forces that are at work when
competition is increased in the goods market. The first effect is stan-
dard. Output increases and so does employment. The second effect
stems from individual bargaining and goes into the opposite direction.
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The authors refer to it as overhiring effect. In response to higher output
demand resulting from increased competition, firms hire more workers.
The structure of individual bargaining in multi-worker firms implies that
more hiring diminishes the bargaining power of workers. Thus, wages de-
crease. The lower income of workers ultimately lowers aggregate demand.
The net effect of reforms on output and employment is nevertheless pos-
itive in their model.
In a similar model, extended to include heterogeneous firms as in
Melitz (2003), Felbermayr and Prat (2011) describe a selection effect of
product market reforms. In particular, they argue that reforms in the
product market only have a positive effect on employment if the policy
increases average firm productivity. In their model, a reform that raises
market entry costs increases unemployment. Such a policy decreases
average productivity because it protects the least productive firms and
allows them to remain in the market. In contrast, a reform that in-
creases recurring fixed costs of production pushes the least productive
firms out of the market and thus affects employment positively. Thomas
and Zanetti (2009) assess the impact of labor market reforms on price
stability in a New-Keynesian model with search and match frictions in
the labor market. They find that the effects of labor market policies on
inflation volatility are quantitatively rather small.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the interaction between
product and labor market reforms. Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Schi-
antarelli (2008), for example, present an extended version of the Blan-
chard and Giavazzi (2003) model where unions can lobby labor market
regulations. They show that product market deregulation is more effec-
tive if workers experience high bargaining power. They argue that when
bargaining power of workers is low, allocation in the labor market is more
efficient, and thus employment is close to its optimal level. Consequently,
the potential benefits of product market reforms are small.
Spector (2004) builds a similar model in which capital is used as
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a production factor and labor is characterized by decreasing returns.
He shows that product market deregulation can be inefficient, especially
if workers’ bargaining power is high. When competition increases in
the product market, the total rents available for distribution decrease.
Workers will use their bargaining power to increase their share of those
smaller rents. However, due to increased competition it is difficult for
firms to pass on these costs to consumers by raising prices. Instead they
prefer to lower labor demand. Consequently, real wages may even fall,
both in the short run and in the long. The author concludes that a high
degree of labor market regulation favors product market regulation.
Bertinelli, Cardi, and Sen (2013) also study the effect of regulation
in product markets on employment in a dynamic setting. They show
that increasing competition in the goods market leads to higher employ-
ment in the long run and that this effect is much larger when labor force
participation decision is endogenous, worker bargaining power is high,
and unemployment benefits are low. They describe this as an multiplica-
tive employment effect. In the short run, however, such policy results in
unemployment.
In a real business cycle model with endogenous product creation and
labor market frictions Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) analyze how deregula-
tion in the product and labor market affect the business cycle in the short
and in the long run. In particular, they consider lowering entry barriers,
unemployment benefits, and firing costs such that one country, Europe,
can catch up with another country, the United States. They find, first,
that reforms can have negative short-term consequences for output and
employment. The result arises from various channels. When firing costs
are reduced, the immediate gain of instantaneous lay-offs outweighs the
gains from lower future lay-off costs. Hence, unemployment increases in
the short run. Reducing barriers to entry in the product market is also
contractionary. One of the effects of the policy is that it reduces the
demand for goods by new firms, which have to do an initial investment
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to enter the market. Another effect is that increased competition result-
ing from product market reforms causes existing firms to immediately
lay off workers. The authors’ second finding is that deregulation in the
product and labor markets is interdependent with respect to its effect on
the volatility of the business cycle. When reforms are initiated simulta-
neously, they reduce volatility and are thus welfare enhancing. Negative
consequences for welfare arise, for example, if firing costs are reduced in
a situation where unemployment benefits and barriers to entry are high.
There is also growing interest in how reforms in one country affect
the economies of other countries. Alessandria and Delacroix (2008) study
labor market reforms in an international context. They show that remov-
ing firing restrictions internationally enhances welfare. However, if such
policy is initiated unilaterally, the reforming country may not be the
major beneficiary. Instead, a large part of the gain is captured by the
foreign country.
Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi (2015) construct a New-Keynesian
model with heterogeneous firms, endogenous producer entry, and labor
market frictions to explore how structural reforms in Europe affect the
global economy, in particular Europe and the United States. Market
reforms in Europe lead to firm entry in both regions and induce higher
employment. The model implies reallocation across sectors in response to
structural changes. The reforming country experiences a rise in produc-
tivity in the exporting sector and an improvement in the terms of trade.
The foreign country experiences firm entry in the exporting sector. The
result in the short run is a growing current account deficit in Europe.
Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori, and Ghironi (2016) study the implications
of structural reforms for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union.
They construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where
labor market deregulation has the form of a reduction in unemployment
benefits and employment protection and product market deregulation
consists of a reduction in regulatory costs that pose barriers to product
35
creation. Their main finding is that the welfare maximizing monetary
policy implies short- and long-run deviations from price stability when
markets in the monetary union are highly regulated. In other words,
long-run inflation absorbs to some extent the distortions implied by reg-
ulation. Deregulation is welfare enhancing in the long run and implies
a lower optimal inflation target. In the short run, the initial optimal
response to deregulation is expansionary (relative to a standard Taylor
rule). Moreover, the authors show that a monetary union benefits from
symmetric deregulation.
The main conclusions drawn from this section are as follows. Theo-
retical research frequently models product and labor market reforms as a
reduction in some cost factor that supposedly enhances competition. The
long-term benefits in terms of output or employment of such policies are
positive. The short-run effects depend on the type and microeconomic
modeling of the labor and product market, such as bargaining structure
or firm entry, as well as timing and interaction of policies. Importantly,
the effects can be negative. Policymakers can enhance the short-term
benefits of reforms by considering the sequence of product and labor
market deregulation and by coordinating internationally.
2.4 Reforms and the Financial Crisis
The advances made in the literature discussed so far stem mostly from
a more detailed microeconomic modeling of market structures. Recent
research suggests that the effectiveness of reforms does not only depend
on the specific characteristics of the labor and product markets, but also
on the state of the economy, monetary policy, and the financial market.
This section discusses recent contributions in this field.
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2014)
argue that in a demand-driven crisis where the nominal interest rate is
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zero, monetary and fiscal policy measures are unlikely to work.13 There-
fore, the authors emphasize supply-side policies, such as increasing com-
petition, as an appropriate tool to enhance recovery from a crisis. To
study these policies, they construct a simple two-period model with
money, monopolistic competition, and price rigidities. The model illus-
trates that when the interest rate is fixed because of the zero lower bound,
competition enhancing supply-side policies are associated with a wealth
effect. Increased competition leads to expectations of higher future out-
put, income, and consumption. In the two-period setting, intertemporal
optimization of households implies that higher future consumption, rela-
tive to current consumption, is accompanied by a rise of the interest rate.
That is, if the interest rate was flexible, the wealth effect would be offset
by a rise in the real interest rate. If, however, the interest rate is stuck
at zero, current consumption must increase so that the optimality condi-
tion can hold. Therefore, the policy stimulates demand immediately in
a crisis scenario.
To the contrary, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) argue that
the real interest rate effect dominates if an economy is at the zero lower
bound. They construct a New-Keynesian monetary dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model of the euroarea and study the effects of struc-
tural reforms that are initiated in the European periphery. The model
consists of two countries that share a common monetary policy. There
are a tradable and a non-tradable sector. Product and labor markets are
monopolistically competitive. Prices and wages are sticky. Labor is the
only factor of production and is immobile across countries and sectors.
Reforms are modeled as reductions in the monopolistic power of workers
and retail firms. The following scenario illustrates how the real interest
rate channel works. First, there is a preference shock that reduces the
13By assumption, conventional monetary policy relies on lowering the interest rate
to stimulate demand. Moreover, they assume that fiscal multipliers are close to zero
in a crisis scenario.
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demand for consumption goods. As a result, goods prices fall. The cen-
tral bank reacts by reducing the interest rate to the zero lower bound
to fight deflation. In this situation, reforms in the product and labor
markets that increase competition cause further deflationary pressure.
The central bank is, however, unable to react because the interest rate
is already zero. The expectation of deflation in combination with zero
interest implies a positive real interest rate. Consequently, households
adjust their plans and postpone consumption to the future. Hence, cur-
rent aggregate demand is further reduced. In summary, although reforms
increase the long-run steady state output, their short-term consequences
are negative.14
The two models presented so far illustrate that the effects of reforms
critically depend on the assumption about which variables can adjust in
which direction. In both models, demand is initially reduced and reforms
imply an increase of future demand. In the first model, the increase of
future demand is channeled through current demand because the interest
rate is kept fixed. To the contrary, in the second model, the preference
shock implies that current demand cannot go up. Instead, reforms drive
up the real interest rate.
There is diverse research with respect to frictions that affect the trans-
mission channels of reforms. For example, Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi
(2016) pose the question of how the reduction of market frictions affects
firm entry in a crisis.15 The authors find that during a period of recession,
the effects or reforms differ from those in normal times. Particularly, the
negative short-run effects of a reduction in firing costs are larger and
more persistent. In a recession, aggregate productivity is low and hence
14The same argument is made in Eggertsson (2012), though in a non-European
context.
15Their model is similar to that in Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), which is discussed
in section 2.3. Consequently, the effects of reforms in normal times are close to the
ones described there.
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job destruction increases when firing costs are reduced, which ultimately
leads to further contraction of output. Reducing unemployment bene-
fits has a positive effect in a crisis because the effect of lower wages on
new job creation outweighs the impact of lower wages on income. In
their model, product market reforms in times of recession have similar
negative effects than in normal times.
One disadvantage of the above described models is that they do not
incorporate capital and investment. However, structural reforms in the
European context are particularly aimed at encouraging investment (see
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2014). Therefore, some authors have studied re-
forms in more comprehensive models. Vogel (2016) uses the Quarterly
European Simulation Tool (QUEST) to study product and labor market
improvements in the presence of a zero lower bound. QUEST is a New-
Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model used by the Eu-
ropean Commission to perform policy analysis. The author shows that
within this framework, short-term consequences of reforms can be nega-
tive. However, the real interest rate effect is much less important than
in the model of Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014). Three features of
the model turn out to be relevant for the transmission of reforms. The
first is the presence of capital and investment, which makes the wealth
effect relevant. Higher future income increases the demand for invest-
ment goods, thereby offsetting some of the negative effects of decreasing
consumption demand. Second, the presence of imperfect capital markets
poses limits on the real interest rate channel. In particular, the presence
of liquidity constrained, non-Ricardian households makes consumption
less sensitive to the real interest rate. Finally, there is a positive effect of
increased competition due to trade with the rest of the world.
Gerali, Notarpietro, and Pisani (2015a,b) present similar results. They
also incorporate physical capital in a New-Keynesian dynamic model. An
aggregate demand shock drives the nominal interest rate to zero in their
model. Reforms induce further deflationary pressure, resulting in an
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increased real interest rate that reduces demand through intertemporal
substitution. They show that reforms do not only affect consumption but
also stimulate demand for investment goods. As capital accumulates, the
productivity of labor increases, magnifying the wealth effect. Eventually,
the wealth effect dominates.
Gomes, Jacquinot, Mohr, and Pisani (2013) study competition en-
hancing policies in the product and labor markets using the Euro Area
and Global Economy Model (EAGLE, see Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani
(2012)), a multi-country large-scale New-Keynesian model, and compare
stand-alone deregulation in sectors and regions of Europe to coordinated
measures. Their results are in favor of reforms, in the short as well as in
the long-run, whether initiated unilaterally or not. Coordination across
sectors and regions can, however, enhance the effectiveness of reforms by
improving terms of trade vis-a`-vis the rest of the world. Gomes (2014)
uses a similar framework to study reforms when the economy is faced
with a crisis and the interest rate is at the zero lower bound. She finds
that structural reforms improve the recovery from a crisis and reduce the
time in which the interest rate is zero. The effect of the zero lower bound
in the short run is minor if the reforms are permanent. Reforms are
followed by an improvement in investment and consumption, as agents
adjust their plans in response to expectations of a better future. In con-
trast, transitory reforms have a considerable negative short-term impact
on output.
Anderson, Hunt, and Snudden (2014) analyze how structural reforms
can help mitigating the negative impact of fiscal consolidation in Europe.
Their starting point is a situation where imbalances have accumulated.
They assume that the European periphery must improve fiscal balances
by means of spending cuts and tax increases. In their analysis, the au-
thors use the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF, see
Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, and Mursula (2010)) of the International Mon-
etary Fund, a comprehensive multi-country New-Keynesian monetary
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model that has some special features: First, it includes overlapping gen-
erations of households and liquidity constraints resulting in large fiscal
multipliers. Therefore, fiscal consolidations have a large negative impact
on short-term output. Second, the model has incomplete asset markets
and a financial sector. The model implies that economic changes are ac-
celerated through the financial market. The main result of the paper is
that structural reforms are an effective tool for smoothing out the con-
traction brought about by consolidation. Agents in the model gradually
perceive the future prosperity that follows from reforms and adjust their
plans accordingly. In other words, there is a wealth effect at work. The
authors also consider the zero lower bound on interest rates, but only
for the first two years after which the rate can fall below zero. This as-
sumption captures easing of the monetary policy. Therefore, it should
be kept in mind that the results shown in the paper do not solely re-
flect the outcomes of reforms, but also those of unconventional monetary
measures.
The paper that is most closely related to the work in this dissertation
is that of Andre´s, Arce, and Thomas (2014). In contrast to the literature
discussed so far, the authors consider some specific characteristics of fi-
nancial markets and the role that debt played in the financial crisis. They
build a dynamic equilibrium model of a small country within a monetary
union. The model is supposed to capture slow and lengthy deleverag-
ing of households and entrepreneurs. Thus, the model has the following
features. First, impatient households and entrepreneurs borrow from pa-
tient households using long-term debt contracts that are amortized at
a constant rate. Second, these debtors are constrained when assuming
debt. Precisely, outstanding debt cannot exceed an exogenously given
fraction of the collateral value. Third, the model includes real estate as
collateral. The model setup implies two different regimes between which
the economy switches endogenously. When the collateral value exceeds
outstanding debt, constrained agents can receive new funds. If instead
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the collateral value relative to the outstanding debt falls below a thresh-
old, credit freezes and the economy enters a period of deleveraging. The
authors then test if product and labor market reforms can enhance re-
covery from a deleveraging scenario. Their results are in favor of product
market reforms. Increasing competition in the product market stimulates
investment in both, the capital used in production and real estate. Con-
sequently, real estate prices rise. As the value of the collateral increases,
the loan-to-value ratio improves, and ultimately the economy switches
to the normal regime. To the contrary, labor market reforms are not as
effective in stimulating demand for real estate in the short run.
To sum up, the recent literature suggests that the effectiveness of re-
forms depends on the state of the economy. In particular, the presence
of a lower bound on the nominal interest rate is relevant for the trans-
mission of product and labor market policies. The above studies vary
widely in how they assess the impact of reforms on the economy. But
there seem to be some common channels through which reforms work.
First, reforms that are associated with lower prices cause deflationary
tendencies, and hence the real interest rate is affected. If it increases,
individuals change their plans and consume less in the present, thus low-
ering aggregate demand. These short-term negative effects are typically
large in models that do not incorporate physical capital. Second, reforms
are associated with higher future output and therefore generate a wealth
affect. In response to higher future income, individuals change their con-
sumption plans so that consumption increases in all periods. The wealth
effect typically dominates in the presence of physical capital. In these
models, reforms that lead to a higher steady state output also imply
higher steady state employment and a higher capital stock. Adjusting
the capital stock to its new steady state level requires the production
of investment goods. Therefore, if reforms lead to higher demand right
after their implementation, they are beneficial both in the short term
and in the long. Moreover, incomplete capital markets have been shown
42
to play a role in both—how the economy is driven into a situation where
the central bank is constrained as well as the transmission of reforms.
The models I use in this dissertation to evaluate structural reforms
deviate from the previous literature in various aspects. In contrast
to Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2014),
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014), and Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghi-
roni (2016), they consider investment in physical capital. They also differ
with respect to how the zero lower bound scenario arises. Eggertsson,
Ferrero, and Raffo (2014), Gerali, Notarpietro, and Pisani (2015a,b), Vo-
gel (2016), Gomes (2014), and Anderson, Hunt, and Snudden (2014) all
assume that the crisis originates from a shock to demand. Such shock
typically delivers a contraction of output in combination with deflation.
However, as was discussed in the introduction, the financial sector has
played a dominant role in the recent crisis. Therefore, the starting point
of my analysis is a shock in the financial market that leads to a credit
crunch as in Andre´s, Arce, and Thomas (2014). The major distinction
from Andre´s, Arce, and Thomas (2014) is the modeling of leverage and
credit market frictions. I use the framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011)
where constraints with respect to leverage arise endogenously from moral
hazard in the financial sector.
The incorporation of the Gertler–Karadi mechanism into a monetary
union model allows me to study structural reforms while addressing the
three key issues that I discussed in the introduction: First, the crisis was
triggered in the capital markets. Second, the functioning of the financial
sector is relevant for the real economic activity. Third, monetary policy
reacted unconventionally during the crisis.
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3 Model I - Closed Economy with Finan-
cial Market Frictions
Structural reforms are primarily discussed in the context of the European
Monetary Union. However, before proceeding to a more elaborated model
of a monetary union, I want to introduce the main ideas and model
features in a parsimonious way. Hence, I present a closed economy model
first. In particular, I describe the crisis as originating from the financial
market and show how reforms affect financial variables.
In the model, households consume a composite of goods, save by
purchasing bonds, and supply labor. Perfectly competitive firms that
produce intermediate goods use labor and capital in their production.
Monopolistically competitive retailers buy intermediate goods and sell
them to consumers. The labor market is monopolistically competitive.
Prices and wages are nominally rigid. There is a financial sector that
borrows funds from households and lends to firms. The financial sec-
tor is balance sheet constrained, leading to financial acceleration when
the capital market is disturbed. Structural reforms are modeled as per-
manent changes in the degree of competitiveness in product and labor
markets.
The framework builds on the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011).
More detailed descriptions including some derivations can be found in
their paper.
3.1 Households
Households maximize their expected lifetime utility. They decide on
consumption and saving and set wages on a staggered basis. The opti-















subject to labor demand and the sequence of the budget constraints
Cj,t +Bj,t = (1 + rt−1)Bj,t−1 + (1− τw)Wj,t
Pt
Lj,t + Tj,t. (2)
Lt denotes the amount of labor supplied, Wt denotes the nominal wage
and Ct is a consumption bundle. β is the subjective time preference fac-
tor, h is a habit parameter, and ν is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Pt denotes the price level, Tt is a placeholder for all net transfers of firm
profits and taxes to households, rt is the real interest rate and Bt rep-
resents the total amount of real bonds. τw is a tax on wage income and
is used by governments as a policy instrument. Et[·] denotes the mathe-
matical expectation of a variable conditional on information available at
time t.
Optimization involves a consumption-saving plan. The household
can, for example, choose to consume less in period t. Thus, her utility in
this period will be lower. Specifically, the change in utility caused by a
marginal change in consumption is given by
%t = (Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ, (3)
which is the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to
consumption in period t. The reduction in current consumption allows
the household to invest in a bond that earns some interest. Consequently,
the household can increase consumption in the following period. When
choosing optimally, the household will equate the foregone utility from
a reduction in current consumption with the discounted expected future
increase in utility. The standard Euler equation presents this behavior
as follows:











Suppose that σ is equal to one, which implies logarithmic utility, and
that the habit parameter is zero. Then the Euler-equation simplifies to
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The left-hand side shows the forgone utility of decreasing current con-
sumption, whereas the right-hand side shows the expected benefit from
saving in terms of utility, discounted by β, which reflects time preference.
They main idea of the habit preference structure is that households’
utility does not solely depend on current consumption. Rather, house-
holds’ utility from current consumption also depends on their previous
consumption level. Habit persistence has originally been introduced to
solve the equity premium puzzle (see Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Abel,
1990; Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) but has mean-
while found its way into the consensus New-Keynesian model because it
helps to resolve the consumption puzzle (see Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 2005). In response to a monetary shock, consumption typi-
cally jumps in the standard constant risk aversion preferences framework.
This pattern is inconsistent with empirical observations which show that
consumption reacts gradually to shocks. Models with habit preferences
can generate a hump-shaped response of consumption to shocks.
To assign a price or value to a stream of future payoffs it is useful to





Πt denotes gross inflation.
In addition to the consumption-saving decision, households decide
on wages that they require in return for supplying differentiated labor.
There are representative labor agencies which buy labor from households
and combine these inputs to form aggregate labor supply. Labor agencies
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where w is the elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to wages.
Labor agencies sell the labor aggregate to good producing firms at the
aggregate wage level Wt. Their optimization problem consists of max-








The first term represents revenue while the second term reflects costs.















Hence, the labor that the representative agency demands from a house-
hold depends on how this household’s wage relates to the overall wage
level. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution, w, determines how labor
demand reacts to changes in wages. Households are more powerful in
setting wages if w is low.
Before introducing wage stickiness and how households set wages op-
timally, it is useful to look at the optimality condition in the case of
a perfectly competitive labor market with flexible wages. In this case,
household would choose labor supply such that the following condition
holds:




The left-hand side shows the marginal loss in utility of working. The
right-hand side shows the marginal gain: The real wage net of taxes
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earned when working an additional hour allows the household to in-
crease consumption, which, at the margin, generates utility %t. Optimal-
ity requires that the marginal loss in utility of working be offset by the
additional gains from consumption.
Wage rigidity is modeled following Calvo (1983). This framework
assumes that not every household is able to adjust its wage in every
period. To implement the idea technically, it is assumed that households
are not able to adjust wages with probability ξ in each period. The















where the choice variable W˜j,t is the reset wage. Optimization is subject
to labor demand, given in Equation (10). The household can be viewed
as an entrepreneur who maximizes profit. The cost covers the disutility of
labor, which is determined in the utility function. The revenue comprises
the net real wage, converted to utility while taking into account the level
of consumption. Because the household cannot adjust the wage in the
next period with probability ξ, it must consider how the reset wage affects
its utility in the future. Moreover, the household takes the adjustment
probability into account when discounting the future. Specifically, when
the probability of not being able to reset the wage is high, discounting
of future periods is smaller. Note that the optimization problem will
simplify to a one-period problem if wages are flexible, i.e. if ξ = 0.



































Πw,t denotes gross wage inflation.
To grasp the intuition of the optimal wage setting decision it is useful
to have a look at the implied steady state result. In this case, the time
subscripts can be dropped and wage inflation is equal to one. Hence, the











Hence, workers impose a markup on the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption. The markup depends on their monopoly
power and the tax rate on wage income. The same result appears, if ξ is
set to zero, that is if wages are perfectly flexible.
It is also useful to analyze the wage index, given in Equation (11)
in the context of the price stickiness. The Calvo setting implies that in
every period the fraction ξ of households cannot adjust wages. Moreover,
all households that are able to adjust choose the same optimal reset wage
W˜t. The current wage index is thus a combination of the previous wage




ξW 1−wt−1 + (1− ξ)W˜ 1−wt
) 1
1−w . (18)
Rearranging Equation (18) and substituting the result into Equation (14)












Hence, the variables XAw,t and X
B
w,t reflect how the reset wage is optimally
chosen, relative to the wage index. If, for example, the marginal utility
of consumption is high, XBw,t will be lower, and consequently the reset
wage will be lower too, relative to the index.
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3.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate good firms are perfectly competitive. They use capital,
Kt−1, and labor as inputs. Capital is owned by the financial intermedi-
aries. The production function is
Yˆt = (UtQtKt−1)αL1−αt , (20)
where Ut denotes capital utilization and Qt determines capital quality.
The real price of replacing one unit of depreciated capital is one. Firms
take prices as given and maximize profits by choosing the utilization rate






Yˆt − δ(Ut)QtKt−1 − Wt
Pt
Lt. (21)
The depreciation function δ(·) is




where ζ is the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to capital
utilization and δA, δB, ζ > 0. The parameters δA and δB will be cali-
brated so that, in the steady state, capital utilization is 100 percent and
depreciation is 2.5 percent quarterly. If the entrepreneur chooses to in-








(1− α)PˆtYˆt = LtWt. (24)
In the optimum, the marginal revenues of capital utilization must be
equal to the marginal cost of depreciation. Similarly, the marginal rev-
enues of employing more workers must be equal to the marginal cost of
labor.
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I assume that the logarithm of Qt follows an autoregressive process
of order one given by
log(Qt) = φ log(Qt−1) + εt, (25)
where φ determines autocorrelation and εt is an exogenous shock. A
disturbance to capital quality does not imply the destruction of physical
capital. Rather, it represents a disturbance to the efficiency of capital
employment. The major implication of this shock is a change in asset
prices. Thus it will be used to initiate the financial crisis scenario.
3.3 Retail Firms
The aggregate output of intermediate goods firms, Yˆt, is divided among





where f denotes a retailer. Retailers buy intermediate goods at price Pˆt,
repackage the goods, and finally sell the finished goods to consumers at
their individual price Pf,t. The final output amount is a constant elastic-
ity of substitution aggregate. This can be viewed as a firm that combines











 is the elasticity of substitution. The aggregate Yt is sold at the aggregate
price level, Pt. The optimization problem consists in maximizing profits







The first term represents revenue while the second term reflects costs.
















Retailers set optimal individual prices Pf,t subject to the prices Pˆt
they pay to intermediate goods firms. Nominal rigidities are introduced
following Calvo (1983). In analogy to wage setting framework, it is as-
sumed that retailers are not able to adjust their price with probability ξ
in every period. A firm that can reset at time t will set a new price P˜t






ξsMt,t+s(1− τP )(P˜f,t − Pˆt+s)Yf,t+s
]
. (31)
A retailer’s profit in any period depends on its margin over the price
of intermediate goods firms, its individual demand, and the tax rate
τP . This tax rate will subsequently represent the policy instrument with
respect to the product market reform. Because the household cannot
adjust the price in the next period with probability ξ, it must consider
how the reset price affects its profits in future periods. Moreover, the
retailer takes the adjustment probability into account when discounting
the future. Specifically, when the probability of not being able to reset
the price is high, discounting of future periods is lower. Note that the
optimization problem will simplify to a one-period problem if price is
flexible, that is if ξ = 0.
In equilibrium, all retailers that reset choose the same price. The



































− 1 Pˆ . (35)
Retailers impose a markup on the price they pay to intermediate goods
firms. The markup depends on their monopoly power and the tax rate.
The same result pops up if ξ is set to zero, i.e. if prices are perfectly
flexible.
Analogous to the wage level, the current price level can be expressed
as a combination of the previous price level and the current reset price:
Pt =
(
ξP 1−t−1 + (1− ξ)P˜ 1−t
) 1
1− . (36)












The variables XAP,t and X
B
P,t therefore reflect how the optimal reset price
relates to the overall price level.
Finally, the output of intermediate goods firms must be equal to re-
tailers’ output multiplied by price dispersion.
YtDt = Yˆt, (38)















All retail profits are transferred to households.
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3.4 Capital-producing Firms
In simple New-Keynesian frameworks, there is no distinction between the
price of a consumption good and a capital or investment good. Thus, the
market value of firm capital is always equal to the cost of replacing each
unit of capital employed. In other words, Tobin’s q, which is the ratio
of the market value of capital to its replacement cost, is always equal to
one.
In reality, the ratio of market-to-book values of stocks or stock indices,
which is a standard measure of Tobin’s q, is frequently not equal to one.
For example, the average price-to-book ratio of the S&P500 between
January 2000 and October 2016 is 2.75. More importantly, the book-
to-market ratio is not constant over time, as was observed during the
recent financial crisis where market prices of assets dropped substantially,
although there was no fundamental shift in replacement costs. The price-
to-book ratio of the S&P500, for example, dropped to a minimum value
of 1.78 during the crisis.
One of the salient features of the Gertler and Karadi (2011) finan-
cial accelerator model is that it can capture deviations of asset prices
from other goods prices. The standard way of driving a wedge between
the market value of capital and its replacement cost is to introduce in-
vestment adjustment costs. The main idea is that it requires resources,
i.e. it is costly for firms to adjust the growth rate of investment upward
or downward. Adjustment costs constitute a constraint on investment,
thereby affecting the price of the investment good. The additional costs
that arise when the capital stock is increased must be balanced with the
additional benefits. These benefits will be manifest in the price of capi-
tal. Specifically, the price of capital will reflect the value of relaxing the
constraint.
To limit the degree of complexity at the level of the firms producing
intermediate goods, it is useful to shift the investment decision to separate
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entities: the capital-producing firms. Since all firms turn out to behave
identically, they are not indexed subsequently. The theoretical structure
is as follows.
After the production of intermediate goods is finalized, capital-producing
firms buy all of the capital stock, rebuild depreciated capital, build new
capital, and finally sell the capital back to firms producing intermediate
goods. Investment adjustment costs only apply for building new capital,
while, as noted earlier, the cost of one unit of depreciated capital is equal
to one. The real cost of creating a new unit of capital stock is PS,t, which
is equal to the real price of a unit of capital in the market.
The optimization problem of capital-producing firms is to maximize
















where net investment Iˆ is given by
Iˆt = It − δ(Ut)QtKt−1. (41)
∆I,t+s is the sum of net and steady state investment:
∆I,t+s = Iˆt+s + I¯ . (42)









Equation (40) shows that whenever the price of capital is larger than
one, capital-producing firms’ revenue will be positive if net investment
is positive and vice versa. The adjustment costs are zero when there
is no change in net investment, i.e. f(1) = 0. Investment adjustment
costs are positive when the level of investment in one period differs from
its previous value, which means the function has its minimum at one:
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f ′(1) = 0. Finally, the costs increase in the absolute deviation, i.e.
f ′′(·) = η > 0.
Optimality requires that the marginal benefit of producing one more
unit of capital in period t is equal to the expected discounted marginal
cost of producing that unit,








which eventually yields an expression for the real stock price in period t:












In the steady state, there is no change in investment, i.e. ∆I,t = ∆I,t−1.
Equation (45) and the properties of the investment adjustment cost func-
tion imply that, in the steady state, the price of capital is equal to
one. Consequently, capital-producing firms do not generate profits in
the steady state. The profits or losses earned by such firms outside the
steady state are transferred to households.
The distinction between goods and capital prices is especially rel-
evant for the financial accelerator mechanism which will be described
subsequently. Changes in asset prices will turn out to have far-reaching
consequences for other variables of the model. Most importantly, they
will affect the flow of funds from households to financial intermediaries
and from there to the goods-producing sector.
3.5 Financial Intermediaries
The centerpiece of the model is the financial sector. As was discussed in
the introduction, the model will capture the main characteristics of the
recent financial crisis. Those include the impairment of balance sheets
of financial intermediaries driven by a fall in asset price, the dysfunction
of credit intermediation caused by an asymmetric information problem,
and spill-overs to the real sector due to increasing capital costs.
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Gertler and Karadi (2011) develop a model to capture these aspects
in an elegant way. They introduce a financial friction by means of a moral
hazard problem that affects the flow of funds between the borrowers and
lenders of capital.
The framework builds on the idea that households do not directly
interact with the goods-producing firms, but instead supply funds to
intermediaries, which channel the funds to firms. In addition, the inter-
mediaries have their own funds that they provide to firms. Therefore,
bankers are leveraged. The moral hazard problem arises from the as-
sumption that banks have the option to divert a share of the households’
deposits. Households are rational and take this option into account.
Specifically, they want their supply of funds to ensure that it is not pay-
ing off for the bank to divert funds. It will turn out that the capital
supply of households depends on the leverage of the financial interme-
diaries. In summary, the moral hazard structure implies an endogenous
capital constraint.
The assumptions underlying this model structure are not entirely in
line with facts. In particular, households’ fear of being betrayed by banks
is not the core problem. Actually, traditional bank runs, in which non-
institutional depositors withdraw huge amounts of funds, were rather
rare during the crisis. Eventually, deposits were guaranteed by the state
in many countries. Instead, the problem emerged predominantly among
financial institutions. Owing to their interconnectedness, any market
participant depends to some degree on all other participants’ ability to
repay debts. Therefore, the bankruptcy of a major institution is relevant
for the entire system. However, it is difficult for anybody to evaluate
which institution is affected and to what extent it is harmed. Moral
hazard arises from asymmetric information. It is not the fear of funds
being diverted. Rather, it is the fear that borrowers do not disclose their
true financial condition.
Although the model assumptions are not entirely justified, the mecha-
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nism nevertheless can capture the major aspects of financial acceleration
during the crisis, including credit rationing, increasing credit spreads,
and contraction of the real economy. In the following, I will introduce
the rationales and conditions in the financial market, explaining how they
finally lead to the desired characteristics.
A fraction of each household comprises bankers while the remaining
fraction is made up of workers. Bankers manage financial intermediaries
whose purpose is to borrow funds from households by issuing real one-
period bonds Bj,t and simultaneously provide capital to intermediate
producers by buying the stock of capital at price PS,t. To do so, the
financial intermediary must, however, have an equity stake Nj,t in the
business. Each bank’s balance sheet is thus
PS,tSj,t = Bj,t +Nj,t, (46)
where Sj,t denotes the share of total capital a banker owns. Relating







PS,tSj,t −Bj,t . (47)
Equation (47) illustrates that a drop in asset prices increases, ceteris
paribus, the bank’s leverage ratio.
Financial intermediaries have to pay interest rt on real bonds. Their











The first term in Equation (48) consists of the difference of the revenue,
which is attributable to capital and the cost of depreciation, relative to
the investment amount. The second term reflects changes in the stock
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price. Note that in the steady state in which D = 1, Q = 1, PS = 1, and
δ = δ¯, Equation 48 simplifies to the standard real business cycle model
result,
rˆK = αY − δ¯K, (49)
provided that there are no markups on prices (Pˆ = P ).
Bankers receive the return on capital and pay interest on deposits.
Each banker’s ex post profit, pBj,t+1, is
pBj,t+1 = rˆt+1PS,tSj,t − rt(PS,tSj,t −Nj,t), (50)
where the first term is the return from the total investment in the firm
and the second term is the fixed interest that the banker pays out to
households. Consequently, a banker’s net worth evolves as follows:
Nj,t+1 = (rˆt+1 − rt)PS,tSj,t + (1 + rt)Nj,t. (51)
If the return on capital exceeds the risk-free return, a banker’s net worth
will grow. The gross growth rate of net worth is:
Nj,t+1
Nj,t
= (rˆt+1 − rt)Φj,t + (1 + rt). (52)
Hence, a high leverage ratio implies, ceteris paribus, a higher growth
rate of bankers’ net worth. To put a limit on capital accumulation, a
finite horizon for bankers is introduced in the following manner. In each
period, the probability that a banker stays a banker is θ. Otherwise, the
banker becomes a worker. However, the ratio of bankers to workers is
constant, which means that exiting bankers are randomly replaced by
workers. Retiring bankers return their accumulated net worth to their
households.











The terminal wealth of bankers can also be written in an alternative way






where ΓAj,t and Γ
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The growth rate of assets, which shows up in ΓAj,t, can be obtained from









The growth rate of net worth, which shows up in ΓBj,t, is given in (52).
Equation (54) thus reveals that, if the return on capital exceeds the
risk-free rate, rˆt+1 > rt, the banker’s optimal choice is to increase total
assets. Specifically, increasing assets by one unit would increase expected
terminal wealth by ΓAj,t units.
Considering that all bankers act identically and that one share of
stock corresponds to one unit of capital, it follows that
Kt = St. (58)
It can be inferred from Equation (48) that, in the absence of financial
frictions, bankers’ optimal decisions to increase total assets would ulti-
mately reduce the return on capital, so that finally rˆt+1 = rt. In other
words, without financial frictions, there will be no credit spread. In this
case there would be no benefit of modeling the financial sector at all.
The introduction of a constraint on financial intermediaries’ asset
accumulation will make the functioning of the financial market relevant
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for real economic activity. Such a financial constraint is modeled by
means of a moral hazard problem. In particular, it is assumed bankers
can cheat by diverting some fraction λ of the funds provided to them
and make a payment to their own household. These funds cannot be
recovered by lenders. However, the banker will not be able to continue
business after cheating. The result of this moral hazard problem is that
households are only willing to provide funds to financial intermediaries
as long as the banker’s net worth is greater than or equal to the value
of the fraction of assets that can be diverted. The incentive constraint is
thus:
Vj,t ≥ λPS,tSj,t. (59)










The result is rather intuitive. First, a more severe moral hazard problem,
i.e. a higher λ, implies that lenders will require that borrowers have
a lower leverage ratio. Alternatively, the result can be interpreted in
the context of the interbank market: If a financial institution lends to
another financial institution, it will require a more solid balance sheet of
the borrower, as measured by the ratio of equity to total assets, when the
asymmetric information problem in the market is worse. Second, higher
expected future profit opportunities of bankers, which are reflected in ΓAt
and ΓBt , imply a higher tolerated leverage ratio.
The leverage ratio is not constant and plays an important role in the
financial accelerator mechanism. Suppose, for example, that a shock lets
asset prices drop. According to Equation (47), the leverage ratio would
increase. However, if households do not tolerate a higher leverage ratio,
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they would respond and reduce their supply of funds. Hence, there is
credit rationing, which is one of the key features the model is supposed to
capture. The lack of credit then affects the intermediate goods producers,
which use capital as a production factor. In other words, there is a spill-
over from the financial sector to the real sector. The result is a lower level
of production, which, in turn, feeds back to firms’ profits, asset prices,
and consequently the financial sector. In sum, the initial disturbance is
amplified.
The final assumption with respect to the financial sector of the model
refers to the equipment of newly established bankers. In particular, work-
ers that randomly become new bankers receive a fraction χ/(1−θ) of the
assets managed by existing bankers as an initial endowment. The aggre-
gate equity position of the financial sector is thus a weighted average of
the equity of existing bankers who remain in business, which is provided
in Equation (51), and the equity of new entrants in the banking sector.
The weights are determined by the survival probability:
Nt = θ((rˆt − rt−1)Φt−1 + (1 + rt−1))Nt−1 + χPS,tSt−1. (62)
The derivation of the above conditions is based on that in Gertler and
Karadi (2011).
3.6 Government and Resource Constraint
The central bank follows a zero-inflation target. To achieve zero inflation,
the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to
it = (1 + i¯)Π
κ
t − 1, (63)
where i¯ is the steady state nominal interest rate, and κ > 1 determines
the strength of reaction to deviations from the inflation target. Hence,
monetary policy follows the Taylor (1993) principle: If inflation increases
by one percent, interest rates should rise by more than one percent. Tay-
lor rules are frequently used in the literature, although the rule is not
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explicitly derived from an optimization problem. The main reason is that
the Taylor principle can easily rationalized within the New-Keynesian
framework with rational agents, because it promotes stability and pre-
vents the economy from being vulnerable to fluctuations and self-fulfilling
expectations (Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin, 2010).
In case there is a lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the rule
changes to
it = max[ilb, (1 + i¯)Π
κ
t − 1], (64)
where ilb denotes the lower interest rate bound. The resource constraint
in this economy is










The discount rate β is 0.995, implying an annual steady state real in-
terest rate of 2 percent. The habit parameter is 0.65 as in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The inverse Frisch elasticity ν is 1.5, as
suggested by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The elasticities
of substitution  in the goods sector and the wage elasticity of substitu-
tion are both 5. The tax rates τP and τw are initially set to 10 percent.
The steady state markups on goods and wages are therefore 38.8 percent
before reforms are initiated. The probabilities ξ that prices and wages
cannot be reset are 0.66.
The parameters of firms producing intermediate goods, capital-producing
firms, and financial intermediaries are calibrated following Gertler and
Karadi (2011).16 The capital share α is 0.33. Parameters of the depre-
ciation function are chosen to match a steady state annual depreciation
of 10 percent and a steady state utilization rate of capital of 100 percent
16Some of these values are based on estimates of Primiceri, Schaumburg, and Tam-
balotti (2006).
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Table 1: Parameters - Closed Economy Model
Households
Discount rate β 0.995
Habit parameter h 0.650
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ν 1.500
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ−1 1.000
Probability of not being able to reset wages and prices ξ 0.660
Retailers
Elasticity of substitution in the goods sector  5.000
Labor agencies
Wage elasticity of substitution w 5.000
Intermediate goods firms
Effective capital share α 0.330
Steady state depreciation δ¯ 0.025
Elasticity of marginal depreciation w.r.t capital utilization ζ 7.200
Capital-producing firms
Elasticity of the price of capital w.r.t net investment η 1.728
Financial intermediaries
Fraction of capital that can be diverted λ 0.4126
Proportional transfer of households to entering bankers χ 0.0026
Survival rate of bankers θ 0.975
Government
Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule κ 2.000
Lower bound on nominal interest rate ilb 0.000
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(δA = 0.021 and δB = 0.033). The elasticity of marginal depreciation
with respect to capital utilization is 7.2. The elasticity of the price of
capital with respect to net investment η is 1.728.
The survival rate of bankers θ is 0.975, implying an expected lifetime
of a banker of 40 years. λ and χ are 0.4125 and 0.0026, respectively.
These values imply a steady state private leverage ratio of 4 and an
average annual credit spread of 100 basis points. The Taylor rule inflation
coefficient κ is 2.
Table 1 summarizes all parameters.
3.8 Steady State and Policy Experiment
The following set of equilibrium conditions summarizes the model.
Euler Equation:









(Ct+1 − hCt)−1 − βh(Ct+2 − hCt+1)−1






































































YtDt = (UtQtKt−1)αL1−αt (75)












(1− α)PˆtYtDt = LtWt (79)
Investment:
Iˆt = It − δ(Ut)QtKt−1 (80)
∆I,t+s = Iˆt+s + I¯ (81)
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Asset Prices:








































(1− θ)(rˆt+1− rt) + θΦt+1
Φt





(1− θ) + θβΛt,t+1((rˆt+1 − rt)Φt + (1 + rt))ΓBt+1
]
(88)
Nt = θ((rˆt − rt−1)Φt−1 + (1 + rt−1))Nt−1 + χPS,tSt−1 (89)
Kt = St (90)
Fisher Equation:
1 + it = (1 + rt)Πt+1 (91)
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Taylor Rule:
it = (1 + i¯)Π
κ
t − 1 (92)
Resource Constraint:









In the following, I drop all time subscripts and describe the steady
state. Price and wage inflation are zero and therefore Π = 1 and Πw = 1.
Moreover, price dispersion, capital utilization, capital quality, the real
stock price, and the marginal rate of substitution are equal to one: D = 1,
U = 1, Q = 1, PS = 1, and Λ = 1. The stochastic discount factor M = β.
Consequently, the nominal and the real interest rate are i = 1/β− 1 and
r = 1/β − 1, respectively.

















respectively. In the goods market, retailers impose a markup on marginal
costs. Workers impose a markup on the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption. The size of the markup depends on the
monopolistic power of the retailers and the workers, which is determined
by the elasticities of substitution in the respective markets, as well as
the tax rates. The policy experiments I make in the subsequent sections
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will consider reductions in these tax rates. As will be shown later, higher
markups lead to lower output.










w − 1 . (97)
Using the resource constraint and the investment equation, we can solve
for consumption:
C = Y − δ¯K. (98)







The derivative of utility with respect to consumption is
% =
1− βh
(1− h)C . (100)
Combining (94), (95), (98), (99), (100), and the optimal labor condition








With 0 < α, β, h, δB, δ¯ < 1, ν > 0, and µp, µw > 1, rising markups
decrease steady state labor. Plugging (101) and (99) into the production













Equation (102) shows that if we decrease markups in the product or labor
markets, we end up with a higher output in the steady state. This re-
flects the central idea behind policies suggesting implementing structural
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reforms in product and labor markets. Diminishing monopoly power
reduces inefficiencies and is conducive to a larger production volume.
The steady state values of capital, investment, consumption, and real






















































Combining the financial sector optimality conditions lets us solve for
the steady state leverage and return on capital:
Φ =




β − θ + θΦ− βΦχ
βθΦ
− 1. (108)
Of particular interest is the parameter λ, which is the fraction of funds
that can be diverted by bankers, and thus represents the strength of the
moral hazard problem in the financial sector. If λ increases, the steady
state leverage ratio decreases. In other words, households require bankers
to be less leveraged if the moral hazard risk is more severe. Besides, the
required return on capital and consequently the spread between the risky
and the risk-free asset are greater when λ is higher. Finally, N can be
obtained by dividing K by Φ.
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4 Model I - Analysis
I run several deterministic simulations to study how the model responds
to exogenous shocks and structural policies over time.17 First, I show
how reforms affect the economy in normal times. Second, I introduce a
financial market shock and compare the behavior of the model with that
of a model with frictionless capital markets. Third, I study the effective-
ness of reforms in the presence of the zero lower bound on interest rates.
Finally, I discuss how the reversal of reforms and the announcement of
future reforms affect the short-term behavior of the economy.
4.1 Product and Labor Market Reforms
In the first scenario, I assume that structural reforms are initiated in the
labor and product markets. Specifically, the policy instruments, namely
τP and τw, are each permanently reduced by one percentage point. Figure
1 plots the responses to such reforms for selected variables. The blue,
green, and black lines show, respectively, the responses to product, labor,
and combined reforms.
As expected, prices fall when markups are reduced in the product
market. Inflation drops, and in response, the central bank decreases the
nominal interest rate. In the capital market, we observe an increase in
asset prices, reduced leverage in the banking sector, and a reduction in
credit spreads. Investment increases substantially to adjust the capital
stock to the new steady state. Overall, the reform increases steady state
output by about one percent. In the short run, output slightly overshoots.
The labor market reform increases long-run output by about 0.4 per-
cent. The short-run impact, however, differs from that of the product
market reform. The reduction in markups, which supposedly decreases
labor costs, is almost completely offset by higher labor demand. Wages
17I use Dynare (see Adjemian et al., 2011) to run all the simulations. Appendix C
contains the code.
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Figure 1: Product and Labor Market Reforms










































































































Note: Responses to a permanent reduction in policy rates in the labor market (green
line), the product market (blue line), and both markets (black line) by one percentage
point. Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All
other numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
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and product prices remain almost constant. Consequently, there are only
minor changes in interest rates.
The effect of combined product and labor market reforms is approx-
imately additive. That is, there are neither benefits nor drawbacks of
combination in this setup.
4.2 Financial Accelerator
To demonstrate financial acceleration, I compare the dynamical behavior
of a model with frictionless capital markets with the dynamical behavior
of a model in which financial frictions arise endogenously from moral
hazard.18 In particular, I consider a two percent shock to capital quality
Qt with an autocorrelation coefficient φ of 0.66. The results are plotted
in Figure 2.
Not surprisingly, the impulse responses qualitatively appear identical
to the ones reported in Gertler and Karadi (2011), as I have only slightly
deviated from the authors’ model.
The initial shock causes a recession. Without financial frictions, the
maximum deviation of output from its steady state is approximately 2.4
percent. With financial frictions, the deviation is 33 percent stronger with
a peak deviation of roughly 3.2 percent. The difference is primarily driven
by investment as opposed to consumption. The maximum deviation of
investment from its steady state value is more than twice as high when
the capital market is not perfect.
The way financial acceleration works in the model is reflected in the
financial sector variables. The recession implies a drop in asset prices of
2.5 percent upon impact in the unconstrained case, but 4.3 percent in
the constrained case. The expected excess return (spread) increases to
4 percent in the model with capital market frictions. The drop in asset
prices decreases the equity value of financial intermediaries. As a result,
18In the frictionless model E[rk]− r = 0.
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Figure 2: Financial Market Frictions


































































































Financial Market Frictions No Financial Market Frictions
Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of two percentage points in the model with
(black line) and without (red line) financial market frictions. Inflation rates, interest
rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All other numbers are percentage
deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
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the debt-to-equity ratio (leverage) increases substantially. A highly lever-
aged banking sector lets households limit the funds they supply. The lack
of credit, in turn, limits the amount of funds that banks can provide to
the goods-producing sector. This channel connects the financial sector
with the real economy.
Although the shock origins from the supply side, the recession is ac-
companied by deflation because of reduced consumption and investment
demand. An important characteristic with regard to subsequent sections
is that the response of inflation to the shock is much more severe if the
disturbance is accelerated in the financial market. Inflation drops to -1.3
and -0.4 percent, respectively, in the model with and without financial
frictions. The central bank rule requires a reduction in the nominal in-
terest rate in order to combat deflation. In the model with the financial
accelerator, deflation is so high that the interest rate drops to -0.6 per-
cent. Hence there is a violation of the zero lower bound.
4.3 Structural Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound
I now consider scenarios where the central bank is limited in its ability to
control the nominal interest rate. As discussed previously, the presence
of cash effectively imposes a lower bound of zero on the nominal interest
rate. Therefore, in what follows the central bank rule is
it = max[0, (1 + i¯)Π
κ
t − 1]. (109)
The black line in Figure 3 shows how the model with capital market
frictions responds to a two percent capital quality shock with an auto-
correlation coefficient of 0.66 as in the previous section. The presence
of the zero lower bound makes the recession worse. Maximum output
deviation from steady state drops to -3.6 percent, 0.4 percentage points
more than in the case where the central bank is unconstrained. Con-
sumption, investment, and labor also deviate more from their steady
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state values. Deflation is more than 2 percent upon impact of the shock,
and the central bank keeps the nominal interest rate at its minimum for
five quarters. The real interest rate decreases slightly. Financial sector
variables are also impacted by the zero lower bound. Asset prices react
more sharply so that both leverage and spread increase relative to the
case without central bank constraints.
Next, I assume that reforms are initiated when a capital market shock
occurs. In particular, the policy parameters τP and τw are each perma-
nently reduced by two percentage points. This policy corresponds to a
reduction in markups of 3 percentage points. The red line in Figure 3
shows the responses to the reforms in a crisis scenario.
The reforms put additional pressure on prices, causing inflation to fall
to -3.4 percent. The nominal interest rate is set to zero by the central
bank, and the real interest rate rises by about 0.2 percentage points
to 2.2 percent. In Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) an increasing
real interest rate is the reason why output contracts in the short term
when reforms are initiated because a high real interest rate represents
an incentive for households to decrease spending. Their model does,
however, not incorporate physical capital. As can be seen in Figure 3,
there are no adverse effect on real variables in response to the reforms.
In the present model, the wealth effect dominates the real interest
rate effect. The product and labor market reforms increase steady state
output by 3 percent. Individuals consider their higher future income and
adjust their plans accordingly. Consumption increases immediately rela-
tive to the case without reforms. The capital market variables also reveal
a positive future outlook. In response to the reforms, asset prices jump
by about 2.1 percentage points. The banking sector leverage decreases.
The expected excess return decreases by about one percent. In sum,
reforms lead to improving conditions in the financial markets, thereby
enhancing the flow of funds from households to firms.
The next scenario increases the magnitude of structural changes. The
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Figure 3: Structural Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound (1)





























































































Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of two percentage points (black line) and
a capital quality shock of two percentage points followed by a permanent reduction
in policy rates in the product and labor markets of two percentage points (red line).
Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All other
numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
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Figure 4: Structural Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound (2)
























































































Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of two percentage points (black line) and
a capital quality shock of two percentage points followed by a permanent reduction
in policy rates in the product and labor markets of five percentage points (red line).
Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All other
numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
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purpose is to check if the real interest rate effect is more influential when
the deflationary pressure is stronger. Figure 4 plots the responses of the
model economy to a permanent reduction in τP and τw of five percentage
points.
As expected, deflation is more severe when reforms are stronger.
Upon impact, deflation is about 5.7 percent annually. The real inter-
est rate jumps to approximately 3 percent. However, the impulse re-
sponses reveal that the wealth effect is still dominant. In fact, the in-
crease in wealth is so strong that the initial shock to capital quality is
more than offset by the reforms. Output and investment increase im-
mediately. There is also a substantial increase in asset prices and a
corresponding reduction in spread and leverage. Interestingly, although
there is no output contraction at all, the overall response of asset prices is
negative. The reason is that output expansion is initially mainly driven
by labor as opposed to capital. While capital decreases in the short run,
labor demand immediately increases. Workers benefit from rising real
wages.
4.4 Temporary Reforms
In practice, there are various reasons why reforms are often withdrawn
sometime after their implementation. As pointed out by Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003), negative short-term consequences of deregulation may
antagonize some individuals or groups. Although there were no undesir-
able short-run implications of reforms in the previous analyses, I proceed
and follow Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) by considering a sce-
nario where reforms are implemented temporarily. Specifically, I assume
that τP and τw are each reduced by five percentage points for two con-
secutive quarters.19 Figure 5 plots the impulse responses.
19Individuals anticipate that the reforms are withdrawn from the third quarter
onward.
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Figure 5: Temporary Reforms






























































































Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of two percentage points (black line) and
a capital quality shock of two percentage points followed by a temporary reduction
in policy rates in the product and labor markets of two percentage points for
two quarters (red line). Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized
percentages. All other numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state.
Time in quarters. 80
Temporary reforms cause short-term pressure on prices. Deflation
upon impact is about 8.4 percent, 2.7 percentage points more than in
the case of permanent reforms. The nominal interest rate is temporarily
reduced to zero and the real interest rate rises to 4.4 percent. The reform
does not increase the steady state output. Hence, individuals do not
expect higher future income. Households, therefore, do not respond to
wealth, but rather adjust their expenditure plans to the real interest rate
and reduce consumption. In the capital market, we observe a further drop
in asset prices and rising spreads and leverage. This response shows that
the initial reduction in demand is accelerated in the financial sector.
The temporary reform initially decreases output by 0.2 percentage
points relative to the crisis scenario. The deviation reaches its maximum
in quarter five with 0.4 percentage points. Overall, the economy has not
recovered from the temporary reform after 20 quarters showing that the
cumulative loss of this policy measure is material.
4.5 Announcement of Future Reforms
The previous experiment has shown that in the absence of higher future
income, deflationary reforms result in a rising real interest rate and have
negative short-term consequences for economic output. Naturally, the
question arises how the economy behaves if there is a large increase in
wealth combined with lower short-run deflation. Therefore, I consider a
case where the government credibly announces structural reforms to be
implemented at some future date. In particular, the policy is to keep the
rates τP and τw at their original levels for eight quarters and permanently
reduce them by 5 percentage points from the ninth quarter onward. The
impulse responses of such deregulation policy are plotted in Figure 6.
Implementing the policy in the future greatly increases the steady
state output. Therefore, individuals are subject to higher future income
and wealth. Nevertheless, the short-term implications are negative. The
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Figure 6: Announcement of Future Reforms

























































































Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of two percentage points (black line) and
a capital quality shock of two percentage points followed by a credible announcement
to permanently reduce the policy rates in the product and labor markets by two
percentage points in quarter eight (red line). Inflation rates, interest rates and
spreads are annualized percentages. All other numbers are percentage deviations
from the steady state. Time in quarters. 82
maximum deviation of output from its steady state value is 5.1 percent,
which is about 1.7 percentage points higher than in the crisis scenario.
The announcement of policy changes also affects inflation. Individu-
als expect prices to decline in the future. Implicitly, current prices rise
relative to future prices. As the implementation date of reforms gets
closer, it becomes more and more attractive to postpone consumption to
the post-reform era. The impulse responses of inflation and the nominal
and real interest rate illustrate this pattern. The real interest rate is
high for an extended period. Thus, consumption is reduced relative to
the crisis scenario in the first few quarters, and the real interest rate effect
dominates. The financial market also reflects the short-term contraction.
Leverage and spread increase whereas asset prices drop relative to the
scenario without reforms.
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5 Model II - Monetary Union with Finan-
cial Market Frictions
Reforms are particularly discussed in a European context. Politicians
and researchers frequently suggest that countries of peripheral Europe,
for example Greece or Portugal, should reform their product and labor
markets and support competition. The following analysis aims at shed-
ding more light on this topic.
I construct a model with two countries that share a common currency
managed by a central bank. Households consume tradable and non-
tradable goods, save by purchasing bonds, and supply labor. Perfectly
competitive firms producing intermediate goods in the non-tradable sec-
tor use labor as input, whereas the tradable sector uses labor and capital
in its production. Labor is mobile across sectors but immobile across
countries. Monopolistically competitive retailers buy intermediate goods
and sell them to consumers. Prices and wages are nominally rigid. In
each country, there is a financial sector that borrows funds from domes-
tic households and lends to domestic firms. The financial sector is bal-
ance sheet constrained leading to financial acceleration when the capital
market is disturbed. Countries differ with respect to their international
competitive position due to taxes, which represent an inefficiency in the
product and labor markets. Structural reforms are modeled as perma-
nent changes in these taxes.
The structure of the model overlaps to a large extent with the model I
have presented in section 3. Because the monetary union model includes
two countries as well as tradable and non-tradable goods, I will do some
minor modifications. In particular, many equations will be determined
in terms of nominal instead of real returns. This is more convenient for
handling prices and inflation rates for various products. I keep the model
description to a minimum while preserving completeness. The framework
builds on the work of Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) who study
84
structural reforms in a monetary union without financial sector. The
capital market framework is that of Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Most of the model equations refer to the home country, which is
considered the periphery of the monetary union. Unless stated otherwise,
similar equations hold for the core of the union, and variables as well
as parameters are identical to those of the closed economy model. A
∗ denotes a foreign variable. Appendix A lists the full set of model
equations.
5.1 Households
Households decide on consumption and saving, and set wages on a stag-



















= (1 + it−1)Bj,t−1 + (1− τw)Wj,tLj,t + Tj,t. (111)
Here, Bt represents the total amount of the nominal bonds. ψBt is a time
varying intermediation cost, which is introduced to ensure stationarity of








with ψB > 0. Thus, if domestic households have a large amount of
debt relative to output, the intermediation cost will be large, and con-
sequently households will have less incentive to assume more debt. If
domestic households are net lenders to the foreign country, they will
earn a slightly lower return on bond holdings. Thus, there is neither
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an incentive to increase lending nor to increase borrowing to the foreign
country indefinitely.20
In contrast to the closed economy model, Cj,t here represents a con-


















The parameter γH reflects households’ preferred share of tradable goods
in total consumption, and ϕ is the elasticity of substitution between
tradable and non-tradable goods. A standard assumption is that 0 < ϕ <
1, which implies that tradable and non-tradable goods are complements.
Households minimize their consumption expenditures:
min
CTj,t,CNj,t
PT,tCTj,t + PN,tCNj,t, (114)
where PT and PN and are the price indices of tradable and non-tradable














Thus, consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods depends on the
preference for tradables, the degree of substitutability between the goods,
and how the respective prices relate to the overall price level. The price





T,t + (1− γH)P 1−ϕN,t
) 1
1−ϕ . (117)
The consumption bundle of tradable goods comprises goods produced at
home (H) and in the foreign (F ) country. The consumption composites
20The transaction cost will be small so that its effects on the model dynamics are





































where ωH and ωF are the shares of domestically produced tradable goods,
and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods produced
at home and in the foreign country. If ρ > 1, domestic and foreign
tradable products will be substitutes. The law of one price holds for
tradable goods. Hence, the price of a tradable that is both produced and
consumed at home (PH) is equal to the price of that same good consumed
in the foreign country (P ∗H). The domestic households optimize their
consumption expenditures as follows:
min
CHj,t,CFj,t
PH,tCHj,t + PF,tCFj,t. (120)
The home country’s demand for tradable goods produced domestically



















H,t + (1− ωH)P 1−ρF,t
) 1
1−ρ . (123)
Thus, consumption of domestic and foreign tradable goods depends on
the preference for home tradables, the degree of substitutability between
the goods, and how the respective prices relate to the price level of trad-
able goods.
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The optimal consumption-saving condition for the domestic house-
hold is:





Households’ wage setting conditions and labor agencies’ optimal de-
mand conditions are identical to those in section 3.
5.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate good firms are perfectly competitive. The non-tradable




In contrast, the tradable goods sector uses capital and labor as inputs.
The production function is
YˆT,t = (UtQtKt−1)αL1−αT,t . (126)





(1− α)Pˆq,tYq,tDq,t = Lq,tWt, (128)
where q ∈ (T,N). The logarithm of Qt follows an autoregressive process
of order one:
log(Qt) = φ log(Qt−1) + εt. (129)
I assume that capital quality is identical in both countries and that fi-







The impact of a financial shock on production will, however, depend on
each country’s capital intensity.
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5.3 Retail Firms
The structure of the retail firms is in general similar to that of the closed
economy model in section 3. The only difference is that here tradable
and non-tradeable goods are distributed by distinct retailers. Therefore,


































The indices of price dispersion are










Capital-producing firms behave similarly to those in the closed economy
model. The main difference is that the cost of replacing a unit of depre-
ciated capital is linked to the price of tradable goods (PH,t) instead of the
overall price index. Thus, depreciated capital is rebuilt from domestic
tradable goods. The cost of creating a new unit of capital stock is PS,t,
which is equal to the price of a unit of capital in the market. The op-



















Therefore, the nominal stock price PS,t relates to net investment as fol-
lows:












The profits earned by capital-producing firms outside the steady state
are transferred to households.
5.5 Financial Intermediaries
In contrast to the closed economy model, financial intermediaries here
issue nominal one-period bonds BBj,t instead of real bonds. Each bank’s




Financial intermediaries have to pay nominal interest it on deposits.
Their investment in the capital stock yields the uncertain nominal re-





















Vj,t ≥ λPS,tSj,t. (141)











(1− θ)(ˆit+1 − it) + θΦt+1
Φt






(1− θ) + θMt,t+1((ˆit+1 − it)Φt + (1 + it))ΓBt+1
]
. (144)
The evolution of aggregate financial sector net worth is given by
Nt = θ((ˆit − it−1)Φt−1 + (1 + it−1))Nt−1 + χPS,tSt−1. (145)
5.6 Government
The central bank follows a zero-inflation target for the monetary union.












respectively. This implies that the periphery and core of the monetary
union are of equal size. To achieve zero inflation, the monetary authority
sets the nominal interest rate according to
it = (1 + i¯)Π
κ
MU,t − 1, (148)
where i¯ is the steady state nominal interest rate and κ determines the
strength of reaction to deviations from the inflation target. In case there
is a lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the rule changes to
it = max[ilb, (1 + i¯)Π
κ
MU,t − 1], (149)
where ilb denotes the lower interest rate bound.
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5.7 Aggregation
The resource constraints in this economy are
YT,t = CH,t + C
∗









Y ∗T,t = C
∗











YN,t = CN,t, (152)
and
Y ∗N,t = C
∗
N,t. (153)
Bond market clearing conditions are
BXt
ψB,t
= (1 + it−1)BXt−1 + PH,tC
∗




t = 0, (155)







Total labor in each country is the sum of tradable and non-tradable labor:
Lt = LT,t + LN,t. (157)
Each unit of capital corresponds to one share issued by firms producing
intermediate goods:
Kt = St. (158)
5.8 Calibration
The discount rate β is 0.995, implying an annual steady state real in-
terest rate of 2 percent. The habit parameter is 0.65 as in Christiano,
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Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The inverse Frisch elasticity ν is 1.5, as
suggested by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution is 0.492, as suggested by Havranek, Horvath,
Irsova, and Rusnak (2015). The elasticities of substitution in the tradable
and non-tradable sectors, T and N , are 7.7 and 4, respectively. Eggerts-
son, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) calibrate these values as they imply steady
state price markups of 15 percent in the core countries’ tradable sector
and 33 percent in the non-tradable sector consistent with the estimates
of Høj, Jimenez, Maher, Nicoletti, and Wise (2007). The wage elasticity
of substitution w equals that of the tradable sector. The tax rates τN
and τw in the periphery are initially 10 percent, leading to markups of 48
percent in the non-tradable sector and 28 percent in periphery wages.21
Tax rates are zero in the core. The probabilities ξ that prices and wages
cannot be reset are 0.66. The elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign tradable goods ρ is 1.5, and the elasticity of substitution between
tradable and non-tradable goods ϕ is 0.5. That is, foreign and domes-
tic tradable goods are substitutes, whereas tradable and non-tradable
goods are complements. The intermediation cost ψ is 0.001 as in Erceg,
Guerrieri, and Gust (2006).
The parameters of firms producing intermediate goods, capital-producing
firms, and financial intermediaries are calibrated following Gertler and
Karadi (2011).22 The capital share α is 0.33. Parameters of the depre-
ciation function are chosen to match a steady state annual depreciation
of 10 percent and a steady state utilization rate of capital of 100 percent
(δA = 0.021 and δB = 0.033). The elasticity of marginal depreciation
with respect to capital utilization is 7.2. The elasticity of the price of
21Markups have been shown to be higher in periphery countries (see, e.g., Dieppe
et al. (2012)). However, there is substantial variation in wage markups across indus-
tries (Jean and Nicoletti, 2015).
22Some of these values are based on estimates of Primiceri, Schaumburg, and Tam-
balotti (2006).
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capital with respect to net investment η is 1.728.
The survival rate of bankers θ is 0.975, implying an expected lifetime
of a banker of 40 years. λ and χ are 0.4125 and 0.0026, respectively.
These values imply a steady state private leverage ratio of 4 and an
average annual credit spread of 100 basis points. The Taylor rule inflation
coefficient κ is 2.
I set the remaining parameters to match consumption demand shares
in the steady state of 67 percent in the core and 48 percent in the periph-
ery, as documented by Lombardo and Ravenna (2012).23 Home bias ω is
0.7 in both regions. The preference shares of tradable goods in the core
γF and in the periphery γH are 0.57 and 0.31, respectively. These param-
eters imply a union-wide steady state import share of 15 percent, with 9
percent in the core and 21 percent in the periphery. Table 2 summarizes
all parameters.
The calibrated model is also reasonable with respect to some other
relative quantities. Real wages are 43 percent higher in the core. To-
tal labor is about 4 percent lower in the periphery due to higher wage
markups. The shares of labor in the tradable sector are 74 and 49 percent
in the core and periphery, respectively. The capital intensity in the core
is twice as high as in the periphery.
23Average values of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands for
the core and of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain for the periphery.
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Table 2: Parameters - Monetary Union Model
Households
Discount rate β 0.995
Habit parameter h 0.650
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ν 1.500
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ−1 0.492
Preference share of tradable goods in core countries γH 0.570
Preference share of tradable goods in periphery countries γF 0.310
Home bias in core countries ωH 0.700
Home bias in periphery countries ωF 0.700
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods ϕ 0.500
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods ρ 1.500
Probability of not being able to reset wages and prices ξ 0.660
Retailers
Elasticity of substitution in the tradable goods sector T 7.700
Elasticity of substitution in the non-tradable goods sector N 4.000
Labor agencies
Wage elasticity of substitution w 7.700
Intermediate goods firms
Effective capital share α 0.330
Steady state depreciation δ¯ 0.025
Elasticity of marginal depreciation w.r.t capital utilization ζ 7.200
Capital-producing firms
Elasticity of the price of capital w.r.t net investment η 1.728
Financial intermediaries
Fraction of capital that can be diverted λ 0.4126
Proportional transfer of households to entering bankers χ 0.0026
Survival rate of bankers θ 0.975
Government
Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule κ 2.000
Lower bound on nominal interest rate ilb 0.0025
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6 Model II - Analysis
I run several deterministic simulations to study how the model responds
to exogenous shocks and structural policies over time.24 Special emphasis
is placed on the impact of the zero lower bound, the similarities between
structural reforms and credit market interventions, and how peripheral
reforms affect the monetary union as a whole.
6.1 Crisis Scenario
To demonstrate the behavior of the model in a crisis scenario, the impulse
responses to a financial shock that hits both countries are plotted in
Figure 7. I consider a 5 percent shock to capital quality Qt with an
autocorrelation coefficient φ of 0.66 .
The dynamics are similar to those shown in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
There is an immediate drop in asset prices and required returns increase
accordingly. Balance sheets of financial intermediaries deteriorate and
leverage ratios significantly increase. There is a lack of credit and the
economy enters a period of recession, which is characterized by unem-
ployment and a decline in investment and consumption. The recession is
long-lasting. The economy has not fully recovered after 10 years. Out-
put contraction is accompanied by deflation, which is mainly driven by
the periphery and, in particular, by the non-tradable sector. Union-wide
inflation drops to -1.3 percent when the shock occurs. The central bank
cuts the nominal interest rate substantially to combat deflation. The
price level in the core increases relative to that of the periphery, which
is reflected in the real exchange rate.
The shock depresses union-wide output by about 4.4 percent after
one year. Output contraction in the core is more severe than in the
periphery because production in the core is much more capital intensive.
24I use Dynare (see Adjemian et al., 2011) to run all the simulations. Appendix D
contains the code.
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Figure 7: Crisis Scenario































































































Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of five percentage points in the monetary
union (black line), the core (green line), and the periphery (blue line). Inflation
rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All other numbers are
percentage deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
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This pattern seems to be at odds with reality as countries in the periphery
have been hit at least as hard as countries in the core. Although it is
straightforward to recalibrate the shocks to get closer to the data, I choose
not to do so for the following reasons: First, it does not alter the main
point with respect to structural reforms I want to make here. Second,
having a symmetric shock makes regional comparison easier. Third, this
scenario does not yet reflect a lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
The presence of a lower bound makes the recession worse, particularly
in the periphery. Finally, this scenario does not consider unconventional
monetary measures of the central bank. There is reason to believe that
some of the excessive output contractions in the core relative to the
periphery were smoothed out by the European Central Bank, as will be
shown subsequently.
6.2 Structural Reforms in a Financial Crisis
Next, I assume that structural reforms are initiated in the periphery’s
labor and product markets. The policy instruments τN and τw are each
permanently reduced by 5 percentage points. Figure 8 plots the responses
to such reforms for selected variables.
The policy’s intention is to reduce markups on wages and non-tradable
goods. Consequently, prices fall and deflation worsens by about 1.5 per-
centage points annually. In response, the central bank decreases the
nominal interest rate to less than -3 percent annually, which is far below
the zero lower bound.
The contraction of output in the monetary union is considerably lower
when reforms are initiated, with a peak deviation of only 2.4 percent
compared to 4.4 percent without reforms. Although reforms are only
initiated in the periphery, both regions benefit in the short run. This is
because the steady state output in the periphery increases by about 1.6
percent. Hence, there is a wealth effect associated with such measures.
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Figure 8: Structural Reforms in a Crisis

































































Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of five percentage points (black line) and
a capital quality shock of five percentage points, followed by a permanent reduction
in policy rates in the product and labor markets of five percentage points (red line).
Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All other
numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
The present value of future income goes up and consumption is adjusted
accordingly. In contrast, saving is not attractive due to negative interest
rates. The capital market also mirrors positive future outlooks. Asset
prices rise by about 5.7 and 5.5 percentage points relative to the crisis
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scenario in the core and periphery, respectively, whereas credit spreads
decrease by 3.3 percentage points. Higher asset prices imply lower bank
leverage and improved liquidity. The flow of credit finally encourages
investment and production.
6.3 Effect of Lower Interest Rate Bounds
The presence of a lower interest rate bound can seriously limit the central
bank’s ability to combat deflation with standard measures. To study the
effects of a lower bound, I run a simulation where the annual interest
rate cannot fall below 1 percent. Figure 9 summarizes the results.
The response functions reveal that the lower bound has the following
implications for the dynamics of the model. First, output contraction
in both regions is more severe. For example, in the scenario without
reforms the maximum deviation from the steady state is 4.5 percent in
the periphery and 6.1 percent in the core, compared to 3.7 and 5.1 percent
in a scenario without a lower bound. The relative impact of the bound
is slightly higher in the periphery than in the core. Second, reforms
are an adequate measure to stimulate the economy, even if the nominal
interest rate is bounded. The impact of reforms on output is qualitatively
identical to that in the scenario without lower bound. In other words,
short-run output recovery is superior in both regions when reforms are
initiated. However, the quantitative short-run effects are smaller when
the central bank is constrained. For example, the average improvement
in union-wide output in the first four quarters due to reforms is 1.7
percentage points in the case without bound and 1.6 percent in the case
with bound.
This result is in contrast to Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014),
who study structural reforms in a similar model without capital and
financial intermediation. In their model, output contracts further in the
short run when permanent reforms are initiated. The reason is that
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Figure 9: Structural Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound (3)








































Real Interest Rate Periphery




















Real Interest Rate Core
Crisis Reforms
Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of five percentage points (black line) and
a capital quality shock of five percentage points, followed by a permanent reduction
in policy rates in the product and labor markets of five percentage points (red line).
Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized percentages. All other
numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state. Time in quarters.
expected deflation increases the real interest rate drastically when the
nominal interest rate hits the lower bound. As a result, households have
an incentive to save and postpone consumption to the future. Since their
model does not include capital, this real interest rate effect cannot be
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offset by investment. In the model I have presented, the real interest
rate is not dominating. The initial shock raises real interest rates by 2.6
percentage points in the periphery and 2.1 percentage points in the core.
The reform causes a sizable deflation in the periphery that raises the
real rate by an additional 4.7 percentage points to 9.3 percent. Hence,
although the real interest rate in the periphery increases to more than
four times its steady state value, there is still a substantial improvement
in output following a reform.
The quantitatively small effect of the reform, compared to the case
without a lower bound, on the nominal interest rate is attributable to the
impact the bound has on credit spreads. In response to the reforms, these
decrease by 3.2 percentage points in both the core and the periphery,
which is slightly less than in the case with no lower bound. Nevertheless,
there is always a reduction in spreads when reforms are initiated.
6.4 Credit Policy and Structural Reforms
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Central Bank and
other central banks implemented large-scale asset purchasing programs in
order to encourage credit intermediation and stimulate the economy. In
this section I compare structural reforms to credit intervention policies.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) study the implications of such unconven-
tional monetary policy measures in a dynamic equilibrium framework.
The main idea is that, on the one hand, the government is less efficient
than private financial intermediaries in intermediating credit, but on the
other hand, it has an advantage because it is not balance sheet con-
strained. Therefore, the government can choose to intervene in any of
the following ways. It can issue government debt directly to households
and use these funds to supply credit to firms producing goods. Alter-
natively, it could issue securities to banks, which, in turn, finance their
security purchases by issuing bonds to households. Either way, the im-
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plications are identical. The fact that there is an unconstrained debtor
stimulates credit flow.
Formally, the government intends to lower credit spreads by varying
the amount of credit it supplies to the economy. Its feedback rule is
Ψc,t = vEt[(ˆit+1 − it)− (¯ˆi− i¯)], (159)
where Ψc,t is the share of publicly intermediated assets,
¯ˆi− i¯ is the steady
state credit spread, and v ≥ 0 determines the strength of reaction to
credit spreads. Thus, if the credit spread increases and credit constraints
tighten in response to a financial shock, the government increases the
share of publicly intermediated assets in order to relax the constraints
and strengthen credit intermediation. Gertler and Karadi (2011) show
that the private leverage ratio Φt is related to the overall leverage ratio
Φc,t as follows:
Φt = Φc,t(1−Ψc,t). (160)
Hence, if the share of publicly intermediated assets increases, the leverage
ratio of private financial intermediaries decreases.
Figure 10 shows the responses to a financial shock if the government
follows a credit policy rule as defined above.25 When the financial shock
hits the economy, the government intervenes to reduce credit spreads.
The issuance of debt leads to improving balance sheets in the finan-
cial sector because government-backed securities are considered safe. As
leverage decreases, investment picks up and the recession is considerably
mitigated.
In contrast to structural reforms, credit policy does not change the
steady state output. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of both policies relies
on the same mechanism: the resolution of deficiencies in the process
of credit intermediation. While credit policy approaches the financial
25I follow the baseline calibration of Gertler and Karadi (2011) in which v is 10.
This parametrization illustrates a moderate intervention strategy.
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Figure 10: Credit Policy

































































Crisis Credit Policy Reforms and Credit Policy
Note: Responses to a capital quality shock of five percentage points (black line),
a capital quality shock of five percentage points followed by credit policy (green
line), and a capital quality shock of five percentage points followed by credit policy
and a permanent reduction in policy rates in the product and labor markets of five
percentage points (red line). Inflation rates, interest rates and spreads are annualized
percentages. All other numbers are percentage deviations from the steady state.
Time in quarters.
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market directly, structural reform policies indirectly facilitate lending
through positive wealth effects. Hence, structural reforms have similar
qualitative implications for the process of financial intermediation as a
direct intervention in the credit market. Both policies lead to a reduction
in credit spreads, rising asset prices, and lower leverage ratios.
Moreover, the two policies are not in conflict with each other. If struc-
tural reforms are implemented in addition to a government intervention,
there will be an additional reduction in credit spreads. With respect to
inflation, the policies have opposite effects. While reforms make defla-
tion worse in a financial crisis, credit policy leads to rising prices. Hence,
credit policy offsets some of the negative effects that reforms have on
prices and reduces the time that the central bank is constrained by the
lower interest rate bound. The reform experiments with and without
credit policy (Figures 9 and 10, respectively) reveal that credit policy re-
duces deflation by more than one percentage point. Moreover, the time
when interest rate is at the lower bound is shortened from five to three
quarters.
The structure of the credit policy experiment implies that there are
government interventions in both countries of the monetary union. Here,
I have assumed that the interventions in both countries follow the same
rule. The quantitative implications, however, are not identical in both
countries due to different magnitudes of capital intensity. Specifically,
the core country, which is more capital intensive, would issue more debt
because the effects of a financial shock are more severe. In a monetary
union, it may therefore be relevant whether the government intervention
strategy is executed by the government independently or by the com-
mon central bank. If each government acts independently, the liabilities
associated with the intervention policy accrue in each government’s bal-
ance sheet and are consequently only borne by national households. If
the same credit policy were initiated by the central bank, the liabilities
would accrue in a common balance sheet. However, the assets and lia-
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bilities of a monetary union’s central bank are typically not distributed
among the member states based on capital intensity. In the European
Monetary Union, the shares are distributed according to population and
output. Thus, the distribution of liabilities when the central bank in-




In the present dissertation, I study how structural reforms in the product
and labor markets affect an economy that is going through a deflation-
ary recession where a lower bound on the interest rate limits the central
bank’s ability to react. The topic is extensively discussed in academic
research. I contribute to that literature by addressing three issues. First,
I deviate from much of the previous literature in the way I characterize
the crisis scenario. Many researchers initiate a crisis scenario by an ex-
ogenous shift in individuals’ preferences, whereas I argue that the recent
crisis resulted from the financial market. I thus model a capital markets
shock that brings about a deflationary recession. Second, I consider fi-
nancial acceleration and spillovers to the real sector in my analysis to
show how reforms are reflected in financial market variables. Third, I
consider that monetary policy acted unconventionally in the aftermath
of the financial crisis. Therefore, in addition to standard Taylor rules, I
consider interventions in the financial markets by the government that
intend to relax credit constraints and stimulate financial intermediation.
My results are based on deterministic simulations of two dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models and are summarized as follows:
First, reforms that increase competition in product and labor markets
permanently have positive effects on aggregate output, both in the short
and in the long run. The short-run effects of labor market reforms are
smaller compared to those of product market reforms because the re-
duction in wage markups due to reforms is partly offset by higher labor
demand. Besides, labor and product market reforms have approximately
additive effects.
Second, a capital market shock will have a much stronger effect on
output and inflation if financial markets are imperfect in the sense that
households face a moral hazard vis-a`-vis financial intermediaries. In fact,
individuals will reduce lending if the banking sector leverage increases
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due to falling asset prices. The credit crunch ultimately affects the goods
producing sector and output contracts. Moreover, the fall in goods prices
necessitates stronger central bank reaction to fight deflation.
Third, if the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound,
output and inflation will react more strongly to a capital market shock
as compared to the unconstrained case. Consequently, the magnitude of
the shock required to cause the interest rate to reach its lower bound is
smaller. Permanent product and labor market reforms increase deflation-
ary pressures. When the interest rate is already at its lower bound, the
central cannot respond to these pressures. Thus, the real interest rate
increases. However, in this framework, a rising real interest rate does not
imply a reduction in current consumption and output. To the contrary,
consumption and output increase immediately in response to permanent
reforms. The reason is that such policy measures are associated with
a higher steady state output, capital stock, and consumption. The ad-
justment of the capital stock to its new steady state level requires the
production of new goods. Hence, demand for investment goods increases.
Moreover, households adjust their consumption plans in anticipation of
higher future income. Financial sector variables also reflect expectations
of a higher future output. In response to permanent reforms asset prices
increase and leverage in the banking sector and credit spreads decrease.
This implies that lending from households to financial intermediaries and
from there to firms increases so that production is facilitated.
Fourth, if reforms are implemented temporarily, the short-term con-
sequences for output will be negative. Such a policy increases short-
run deflation and lets the real interest rate rise. In contrast to perma-
nent reforms, temporary reforms do not increase steady state output and
wealth. Consequently, households reduce consumption in the short run
in response to the higher real interest rate.
Fifth, structural reforms that are credibly announced for some future
date are associated with higher output and income in the long run while
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simultaneously deflationary expectations are reduced. Nevertheless, the
short-term consequences are negative. Such a policy increases current
prices relative to future prices. If the central bank follows a strict in-
flation target, it will respond by increasing the nominal interest rate.
Eventually, the real interest rate increases and households postpone con-
sumption until reforms are implemented. Investment does not outweigh
this effect because the capital stock needs not be increased before the
implementation of the reforms.
Sixth, permanent structural reforms could also improve recovery from
a financial crisis if they are implemented in a currency union. By in-
creasing competition in the product and labor markets, the reforming
country increases output in the long run, and the positive wealth ef-
fect associated with reforms lets the economy recover faster from the
financial crisis. Although the non-reforming country does not experience
higher steady-state output, it nevertheless benefits in the short run from
increased demand for tradable goods from the reforming country. The
financial sector variables also reflect this result, as asset prices increase in
all countries when reforms are implemented permanently. Hence, reforms
will be beneficial on a union-wide level even if they are only implemented
in one region.
Seventh, structural reforms have qualitatively similar effects on the
financial variables to unconventional monetary policy measures that stim-
ulate credit flow. Both policies induce a reduction in credit spreads, rising
asset prices, and an improvement of the financial condition of financial
intermediaries. Hence, both policies improve the financial sector’s ability
to carry out its main function, i.e. the channeling of funds from lenders
to borrowers. While credit intervention policies approach the financial
constraints directly, structural reform policies indirectly facilitate lend-
ing through positive wealth effects. The policies again do not conflict
with each other. The combination of credit intervention and structural
reforms improves the recovery from the financial crisis as compared to
109
stand-alone measures. Finally, credit policies could affect the members
of a currency union asymmetrically if they are initiated by a common
central bank. Especially if member countries differ with respect to cap-
ital intensity, the distribution of funds flowing to each country may not
match the distribution of central bank liabilities.
Overall, my results reveal that taking the financial sector into account
in the evaluation of structural reforms leads to policy implications that
stand in contrast to the findings of some previous studies. I show that
permanent reforms are appropriate to mitigate a financial crisis. They
work in the short as well as in the long run, in the presence of a lower
bound on interest rates, and in the case that government implements
unconventional monetary policy. Permanent reforms generate wealth.
Asset prices and required returns adjust accordingly. The credit market
becomes more liquid. Credit intermediation enhances, and eventually
the real sector benefits. The model suggests that structural reforms that
increase competition in product and labor markets are an appropriate
tool to combat economic contraction in a financial crisis.
The results are based on a model that obviously relies on assumptions
and thus does capture every aspect of the economic environment. The
final paragraphs review the results considering some alternative model
specifications that are frequently used in the literature. Moreover, some
limitations of the model are discussed and directions of future research
are proposed.
The model that I presented omits a standard feature of many re-
cent dynamic general equilibrium models—the working capital channel.
The main idea is that firms require short-term funding in order to fi-
nance working capital. This channel has important implications for the
model’s dynamics when monetary policy is assumed to follow the Taylor
principle. In particular, interest rate changes affect the marginal cost
of production in addition to influencing aggregate spending behavior.
Hence, if the central bank reacts to inflation by increasing the interest
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rate, marginal costs will increase, and thus there will be more upward
pressure on prices. If this channel is too dominant, Taylor rules will
have destabilizing effects on the economy (see Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 2005; Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin, 2010). Includ-
ing working capital in the model that I have presented would have some
quantitative effects. Specifically, there would be additional downward
price pressure during the crisis because the central bank’s reaction to
the financial shock involves a reduction in the nominal interest rate that
would reduce the cost of working capital. The presence of a zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate would have two implications. On the
one hand, the real interest rate would rise further which would worsen
the crisis. On the other hand, the zero lower bound would impose a limit
on the effects of this channel. The effects of reforms in the crisis scenario,
however, would not change qualitatively. There would still be a wealth
effect associated with reforms.
Another simplifying assumption I make is that the monetary union
consists of two equally sized regions. This assumption is also made by
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) because the periphery countries to-
gether make up a substantial share of total output. It is straight forward
to extend the model to incorporate a size parameter. The results would,
however, only change quantitatively, not qualitatively. For instance, if
the periphery were smaller, the core country would benefit relatively less
from reforms in the periphery. This is because the increase in the demand
for tradeable goods would be relatively smaller.
One of the distinguishing features of my study is that the financial
crisis is initiated by a supply-side shock. Other authors, for example
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014), model the crisis as arising from
the demand side of the economy. A standard procedure to do this is to
exogenously disturb households’ optimization by means of a preference
shock such that consumption demand decreases. In the Appendix B I
construct a similar scenario and show that structural reforms also work in
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a demand-driven crisis scenario. Moreover, I show that a preference shock
would have some counter-factual implications in my model. A preference
shock that decreases consumption demand implies that spreads decrease
in the recession. This pattern was not observed during the financial crisis.
Instead, spreads increased.
A shortage of the monetary union model is that the financial sectors
are separated. That is, households save domestically and each country’s
financial sector invests in the domestic capital stock only. Thus, banks’
investments are not diversified across countries. Nevertheless, two fea-
tures of the model implicitly link the financial sectors closely to each
other. First, the price of a unit of capital stock in each country is con-
nected to the price of the tradable good. By assumption, domestic and
foreign tradable goods are close substitutes and hence their prices be-
have similarly. Second, I have assumed that capital quality follows the
same stochastic process in both regions. Thus, financial shocks appear
simultaneously in the monetary union. Owing to these two model fea-
tures, asset prices and credit spreads behave almost identically in both
the regions (see, e.g., figures 7, 9, and 10). I therefore argue that the
separation is not critical with respect to the results. Minor differences in
domestic and foreign asset prices could also be interpreted as resulting
from a home bias in investment, analogous to the bias in consumption of
tradable goods.
The model does also not incorporate trade with the rest of the world.
Although I leave the quantitative evaluation of reforms in an extended
model to future research, I suspect that reforms would affect the core
and the periphery of the monetary union asymmetrically. Reforms in
the periphery imply a reduction in the price level of the periphery and,
to a smaller extend, a reduction in the price level of the monetary union.
Given deflation in the monetary union, the common currency would likely
appreciate vis-a-vis the foreign currency in the short run. This would
make tradable goods produced in the monetary union expensive relative
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to the outside countries. Assuming that the core countries have a larger
share of tradable goods production, then it follows that they would be
affected more by changes in the exchange rate. Whether or not the core
countries would benefit in the short run from reforms in the periphery
depends on the distribution of trade. A higher share of trade with pe-
riphery countries would increase the benefits from an increased demand
in those countries.
The main element of the model is the financial sector. Endogenous
credit constraints arise due to a moral hazard problem between house-
holds and banks. As mentioned already in the model description, this
characteristic may be challenged because credit rationing emerged pre-
dominantly among financial institutions themselves during the crisis.
Nevertheless, the mechanism can generate some major features of the
recent crisis including credit rationing, increasing credit spreads, and
sharp and persistent contraction of the real economy. However, a draw-
back of the model is that leverage behaves countercyclically. That is, a
favorable supply shock is accompanied by decreasing leverage. The boom
period preceding the financial crisis was, to the contrary, characterized
by increasing leverage.
Another interesting extension could therefore be to study structural
reforms in a framework in which banking crisis results from a boom. For
example, in the model of Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016) a banking
crisis and a subsequent recession can emerge from a sequence of favorable
non-permanent supply shocks that lead to an expansion of credit and
lower interest rates. Consequently, counter-party risk in the interbank
market increases and, if the interest rate falls below a threshold, the
market freezes. Structural reforms, especially if they were reversed or
expected to be reversed in the future, could in the short run have effects
similar to non-permanent supply shocks, lead to credit expansion, and
make a financial crisis more likely. Thus, future research may consider
the design of structural reforms not solely for responding to a crisis but
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also as a potential source.
Some critical implications of the financial sector framework are also
pointed out by Cole (2011). One questionable feature is that firms are
prevented from self-financing their investments which would correspond
to financing at the interest rate. Instead, the model imposes that firms
refinance themselves every period, thereby effectively paying the return
to capital which is higher than the interest rate in the steady state.
Another issue is that banks in the model do not hedge their risk across
states of the world. Moreover, the size of the banking sector is limited
because bankers have a limited lifetime and new entering bankers receive
relatively small initial endowments. Relaxing these assumptions would
reduce the vulnerability of the economy to financial acceleration.
A critical assumption is also made with respect to credit intermedia-
tion by the government. Particularly, there is no moral hazard involved
if the government acts as a financial intermediary. Moreover, it is implic-
itly assumed, that there is no limit for the government to issue bonds.
Whether or not these assumptions are justified is subject to debate. On
the one hand, central banks increased their balance sheet substantially
during the crisis, which indicates that the assumption is, at least to
some degree, justified. On the other hand, there are limits to borrow-
ing as seen, for example, in some countries of the European periphery.
The results of my study, which primarily concern structural reforms, do,
however, not rely on these assumptions. Another relevant aspect is how
expectations of government interventions affect the optimal behavior of
economic agents. Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012), for example,
show that expectations of government interventions in a crisis scenario
increase financial intermediaries’ optimal leverage, and thus the economy
becomes more vulnerable to shocks. Again, the degree of leverage does
not qualitatively affect the functioning of the wealth effect associated to
reforms.
In this study, I consider the interaction of structural reform policies
114
and monetary policy in a financial crisis. A more comprehensive model
could also consider the trade-offs or complementaries with other related
policies. Besides reforms, government spending and fiscal consolidation
are among the most intensively discussed suggestions to reduce imbal-
ances in the European Monetary Union. According to the academic liter-
ature, these policies may affect an economy differently in a crisis than in
normal times (see Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Mu¨ller, 2010; Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011; Erceg and Linde, 2012). Specifically, the
government spending multiplier can be high during a recession when the
interest rate is at its lower bound. Government spending imposes upward
pressure on prices, which in normal times induces the monetary author-
ity to increase the interest rate which, in turn, offsets the positive effects
of government spending on output. When the interest rate is bound at
zero, these offsetting effects are limited and thus spending multipliers are
large. Anderson, Hunt, and Snudden (2014) consider a scenario where
fiscal consolidation is contractionary due to high multipliers. They show
that structural reforms are beneficial in such a scenario because they off-
set some of the negative effects by initiating wealth effects. The model
that I construct does not take fiscal consolidation into account. That
is, tax cuts do no not affect government spending. Instead, taxes are
transferred lump sum to households. If tax cuts would reduce govern-
ment spending, some of the positive effects would be offset. However,
although the policy instrument shows up as a tax rate in my model, the
main idea is that reforms involve a reduction in an inefficiency. Thus,
reforms can also be thought of as initiatives which not affect the govern-
ment budget extensively, such as reductions of barriers to market entry
or deregulation. Reforms therefore do not necessarily imply a reduction
in government spending. Although the positive wealth effects of reforms
suggest that they are beneficial regardless of whether government spend-
ing is increased or decreased, there is reason to believe that increasing
spending is more complementary to structural reforms. The main reason
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is that government spending increases upward pressure on prices. Thus,
it cancels out the downward pressure on prices and the rise of the real
interest rate which are implied by structural reforms when the interest
rate is at the zero lower bound.
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Appendix
A Equilibrium Conditions - Monetary Union Model
Euler Equations:
















(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ − βh(Ct+2 − hCt+1)−σ





(C∗t+1 − hC∗t )−σ − βh(C∗t+2 − hC∗t+1)−σ








































































































































































































































































































































































(1− α)PˆT,tYT,tDT,t = LT,tWt (A.49)
(1− α)Pˆ ∗T,tY ∗T,tD∗T,t = L∗T,tW ∗t (A.50)
(1− α)PˆN,tYN,tDN,t = LN,tWt (A.51)
(1− α)Pˆ ∗N,tY ∗N,tD∗N,t = L∗N,tW ∗t (A.52)







Iˆt = It − δ(Ut)QtKt−1 (A.55)
Iˆ∗t = I
∗
t − δ(U∗t )QtK∗t−1 (A.56)
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∗






































































(1− θ)(ˆit+1 − it) + θΦt+1
Φt







(1− θ)(ˆi∗t+1 − it) + θ
Φ∗t+1
Φ∗t










(1− θ) + θM∗t,t+1((ˆi∗t+1 − it)Φ∗t + (1 + it))ΓB∗t+1
]
(A.72)
Nt = θ((ˆit − it−1)Φt−1 + (1 + it−1))Nt−1 + χPS,tSt−1 (A.73)
N∗t = θ((ˆi
∗
t − it−1)Φ∗t−1 + (1 + it−1))N∗t−1 + χP ∗S,tS∗t−1 (A.74)
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it = (1 + i¯)Π
κ







YT,t = CH,t + C
∗









Y ∗T,t = C
∗











YN,t = CN,t (A.81)






= (1 + it−1)BXt−1 + PH,tC
∗
H,t − PF,tCF,t (A.83)
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This experiment shall illustrate that structural reforms are also beneficial
in a scenario in which the crisis is demand-driven.
To examine this question I consider a preference shock as typical in
the literature. That is, the discount factor is exogenously disturbed so
that households’ desire to save increases. Formally, a preference variable,








which in the case of log-utility leads to the following simple Euler equa-
tion:










A positive shock to Υt implies that households suddenly attribute more
weight to future consumption when optimizing expected utility. Con-
sequently, current consumption drops. Therefore, a positive preference
shock represents a negative demand shock.
However, in the baseline calibration of the monetary union model, a
positive shock to preferences raises output immediately. Although con-
sumption drops, investment demand is so high that it ultimately out-
weighs consumption. The reason is that shocks to preferences let spreads
drop and even become negative.
In order to construct a scenario in which output contracts and spreads
remain positive I set the habit parameter to zero and initiate a 25 basis
points preference shock with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.95. In
addition, I consider a reduction in the tax rates of 50 basis points. I
also increase the lower bound on the interest rate because the drop of
the interest rate is not sufficiently large. Figure 11 plots the impulse
responses.
The combination of shock and reform pushes the credit spread tem-
porarily to zero. Consumption demand drops and is not outweighed by
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Figure 11: Demand-driven Crisis












































































Note: Responses to a preference shock of 25 basis points (black line) and a preference
shock of 25 basis points followed by a permanent reduction in policy rates in the
product and labor markets of 50 basis points (red line). Inflation rates, interest rates
and spreads are annualized percentages. All other numbers are percentage deviations
from the steady state. Time in quarters.
investment. Therefore, output contracts upon impact. Prices in the
goods market fall and the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate
to combat deflation. In the financial market, the immediate reaction
is an increase in the demand for assets or, alternatively, the supply of
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funds. Consequently, asset prices rise and required excess returns fall.
As capital is cheap, the demand for investment goods rises which reduces
the strength of economic contraction.
The experiment reveals that structural reforms also work in this sce-
nario. The channel is similar to that in a supply-driven crisis. Growth
expectations associated with reforms lead to rising asset prices. Spreads
tighten and the supply of credit increases. Capital is cheap and produc-
tion expands. However, the scenario is not in line with the empirical
observation that spreads increased during the financial crisis.
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C Dynare Code - Closed Economy Model
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





I_net //Net demand for investment goods
I_SS // Steady state demand for investment goods
Y // Output
YD // Output
L // Total labor
K // Capital
U // Utilization of capital
Rk // Return on capital (gross)
R //Real interest rate (gross)
R_nom // Nominal interest rate (gross)
dU_dC // Derivative of utility wrt consumption
MRS // Marginal rate of substitution (real)
NMRS // Marginal rate of substitution (nominal)
// Prices
W //Wage (real)









PHI // Private leverage ratio
N //Net worth of bankers
RHO_C
RHO_D
Ex_Ret //Spread , Expected excess return
Q // Price (real) of capital
// Processes




% 2. Defining exogenous variables
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
varexo
e_Qual // Capital quality shock
tau_P // Policy instrument product market
tau_W // Policy instrument labor market
;
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% 3. Defining parameters
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
parameters
betta // Subjective discount rate
h // Habit parameter
siggma // Relative risk aversion
nu // Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
alppha // Capital share
eps_C // Elasticity of substition goods sector
eps_W // Elasticity of substitution wages
xi // Probability of keeping prices fixed
psi_infl // Taylor rule parameter
lambda // Fraction of capital that can be diverted by bankers
chi // Proportional transfer to entering bankers
theta // Survivial rate of bankers
PHI_SS // Steady state leverage
Rk_SS // Steady state return on capital
etta // Elasticity of the price of capital wrt capital utilization
zeta // Elasticity of marginal depreciation wrt net investment
delta // Steady state depreciation
delta_a // Parameter to fix steady state utilization
delta_b // Parameter to fix steady state utilization




















PHI_SS = (((-theta )* lambda + betta*theta*lambda - betta*chi + betta*theta*chi +
sqrt (( -4)* betta*theta *(((- betta) + betta*theta ))* lambda*chi
+ (( theta*lambda - betta*theta*lambda
+ betta*chi - betta*theta*chi ))^2))/(2* betta*theta*lambda*chi ));
Rk_SS = (betta -theta+theta*PHI_SS -betta*PHI_SS*chi )/( betta*theta*PHI_SS );
delta = 0.025;
delta_b = (Rk_SS -1+ delta) ;







((1-xi*Infl^(eps_C -1))/(1 -xi))^(1/(1 - eps_C)) = eps_C /(eps_C -1) * RHO_A/RHO_B;
RHO_A = Y * dU_dC * MC_C + betta*xi* (Infl (+1))^( eps_C)*RHO_A (+1);
RHO_B = Y * (1-tau_P )*dU_dC + betta*xi* (Infl (+1))^( eps_C -1)* RHO_B (+1);
Disp = xi*Infl^eps_C*Disp (-1)+(1-xi)*((1-xi*Infl^(eps_C -1))/(1 -xi))^( eps_C/(eps_C -1));
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//WAGE SETTING
((1-xi*WInfl ^(eps_W -1))/(1 -xi ))^((1+ eps_W*nu)/(1- eps_W )) = eps_W/(eps_W -1)* RHO_WA/RHO_WB;
RHO_WA = (L)^(1+nu) + betta*xi* (WInfl (+1))^( eps_W *(1+nu))* RHO_WA (+1);
RHO_WB = (1-tau_W )* dU_dC * W * L + betta*xi* (WInfl (+1))^( eps_W -1)* RHO_WB (+1);
WInfl = W/W(-1) * Infl;
// HOUSEHOLDS
//First -order condition
dU_dC = ((C-h*C(-1))^(- siggma) - betta*h*(C(+1)-h*C)^(- siggma ));
MRS = (dU_dC / dU_dC (-1));
NMRS = MRS /Infl;
1 = betta* R * (MRS (+1)) ;
// INTERMEDIATE GOODS FIRMS
// Production function
YD = (U*Qual*K( -1))^( alppha )*L^(1- alppha );
YD = Y*Disp;
// Optimal labor
W = MC_C*(1- alppha )*YD/L;
// Optimal utilization
YD*MC_C = ( (delta_b*U^zeta) *U *Qual*K( -1))/ alppha;
// Evolution of capital
K = Qual*K(-1) + I_net;
I_net = I - (delta_a + delta_b /(1+ zeta)*U^(1+ zeta ))* Qual*K(-1);
// Return on capital
Rk = ((MC_C*alppha*YD/(Qual*K(-1))
+Q-( delta_a+delta_b /(1+ zeta)*U^(1+ zeta )))* Qual)/Q(-1);
Ex_Ret = (Rk(+1) - R);
// CAPITAL PRODUCING FIRMS
//First order condition
Q = 1+ etta /2*(( I_net+I_SS )/( I_net (-1)+ I_SS) -1)^2
+ (I_net+I_SS )/( I_net (-1)+ I_SS)* etta *(( I_net+I_SS )/( I_net (-1)+ I_SS) -1)
- betta *((MRS (+1)))* ((I_net (+1)+ I_SS )/( I_net+I_SS ))^2
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* etta *(( I_net (+1)+ I_SS )/( I_net+I_SS )-1);
I_SS = steady_state(I);
// FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
//First -order condition: financial intermediaries
RHO_C = (1-theta)*betta *((MRS (+1)))*( Rk(+1)-R)
+ betta *((MRS (+1)))* theta*(PHI (+1)/ PHI * ((Rk(+1)-R)*PHI + R))* RHO_C (+1);
RHO_D = (1-theta) + betta *((MRS (+1)))* theta* ((Rk(+1)-R)*PHI + R)* RHO_D (+1);
PHI = RHO_D/(lambda -RHO_C);
// Demand for assets
Q*K = PHI*N;
// Evolution of bankers net worth
N = theta *((Rk -R(-1))*PHI(-1)+R(-1))*N(-1) + chi*Q*K(-1);
// ECONOMY RESOURCE CONSTRAINT
Y = C + I + etta /2*(( I_net+I_SS )/( I_net (-1)+ I_SS) -1)^2*( I_net+I_SS) ;
// CENTRAL BANK RULE
//R_nom = 1/betta*Infl^psi_infl; // Standard Scenario
R_nom = max(1.00, 1/betta*Infl^psi_infl ); //ZLB Scenario
// FISHER EQUATION
R_nom = R*(Infl (+1));
// STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
// Quality of capital





















































































tau_P = 0.1; // Policy instrument











// Standard shock scenario:
var e_Qual; periods 1;
values 0.02;
//Short -term reforms:
//var tau_P; periods 1:2;
// values 0.05;
//var tau_W; periods 1:2;
// values 0.05;
// Future credible reforms after 8 Quarters:
//var tau_P; periods 1:8;
// values 0.1;
//var tau_W; periods 1:8;
// values 0.1;
end;
simul(periods =100, maxit =100);
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D Dynare Code - Monetary Union Model
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% 1. Defining endogenous variables
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
var
C_NHH // Consumption of non -tradables ... produced in home ... consumed in home
C_THH // Consumption of tradables ... produced in home ... consumed in home
C_THF // Consumption of tradables ... produced in home ... consumed in foreign
C_NFF // Consumption of non -tradables ... produced in foreign ... consumed in foreign
C_TFF // Consumption of tradables ... produced in foreign ... consumed in foreign
C_TFH // Consumption of tradables ... produced in foreign ... consumed in home
C_TH // Consumption of tradables ... consumed in home
C_TF // Consumption of tradables ... consumed in foreign
C_H // Total home consumption
C_F // Total foreign consumption
Y_TH // Output of tradables produced in home
Y_TF // Output of tradables produced in foreign
Y_NH // Output of non -tradables produced in home
Y_NF // Output of non -tradables produced in foreign
Y_H // Total home output
Y_F // Total foreign output
Y_MU //Total output of Monetary Union
YD_TH // Output of tradables produced in home
YD_TF // Output of tradables produced in foreign
YD_NH // Output of non -tradables produced in home
YD_NF // Output of non -tradables produced in foreign
L_TH //Labor tradables produced in home
L_TF //Labor tradables produced in foreign
L_NH //Labor non -tradables produced in home
L_NF //Labor non -tradables produced in foreign
L_H // Total labor home
L_F // Total labor foreign
//All prices and wages are relative to the monetary union price level
W_H //Real wage home
W_F //Real wage foreign
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P_int_TH // Marginal cost of tradables home
P_int_NH // Marginal cost of non -tradables home
P_int_TF // Marginal cost of tradables foreign
P_int_NF // Marginal cost of non -tradables foreign
p_THH //Price of tradables ... produced in home ... consumed in home (= p_THF)
p_TFF //Price of tradables ... produced in foreign ... consumed in foreign (=p_TFH)
p_NH //Price of non -tradables ... produced in home ... consumed in home
p_NF //Price of non -tradables ... produced in foreign ... consumed in foreign
p_TH //Price index of tradables ... consumed in home
p_TF //Price index of tradables ... consumed in foreign
p_H //Home price index
p_F // foreign price index
Disp_TH //Price dispersion tradables home
Disp_NH //Price dispersion non -tradables home
Disp_TF //Price dispersion tradables foreign
Disp_NF //Price dispersion non -tradables foreign
Infl_TH // Inflation of tradables in home
RHO_A_TH
RHO_B_TH
Infl_NH // Inflation of non -tradables in home
RHO_A_NH
RHO_B_NH
Infl_TF // Inflation of tradables in foreign
RHO_A_TF
RHO_B_TF
Infl_NF // Inflation of non -tradables in foreign
RHO_A_NF
RHO_B_NF
Infl_MU // Inflation in Monetary Union
Infl_H // Inflation home
Infl_F // Inflation foreign
R_nom // Nominal interest rate (gross)
dU_dC_H // Derivative of utility wrt consumption home
dU_dC_F // Derivative of utility wrt consumption foreign
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MRS_H // Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution home (real)
MRS_F // Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (real)
NMRS_H // Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (nominal)
NMRS_F // Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (nominal)
WInfl_H //Wage inflation of tradables in home
RHO_WA_H
RHO_WB_H
WInfl_F //Wage inflation of tradables in foreign
RHO_WA_F
RHO_WB_F
PHI_H // Leverage home
RHO_FA_H
RHO_FB_H
PHI_F // Leverage foreign
RHO_FA_F
RHO_FB_F
Rk_nom_H // Nominal gross return on capital home
Rk_nom_F // Nominal gross return on capital foreign
Q_H // Relative stock price home (relative to price p_THH)
Q_F // Relative stock price foreign (relative to price p_TFF)
N_H //Net worth of bankers home
N_F //Net worth of bankers foreign
U_H // Utilization of capital home
U_F // Utilization of capital foreign
K_HH // Capital employed in home
K_FF // Capital employed in foreign
I_HH // Investments made in home
I_FF // Investments made in foreign
I_HH_net //Net -investments made in home
I_FF_net //Net -investments made in foreign
I_HH_SS // Steady state investments made in home
I_FF_SS // Steady state investments made in foreign
B_H // Total holding of bonds in home
B_F // Total holding of bonds in foreign
152
psi_Bond // Intermediation cost in bond market (ensures stationarity)
Qual_H // Qualtiy of capital , valuation of capital home
Qual_F // Qualtiy of capital , valuation of capital foreign
Pref // Qualtiy of capital , valuation of capital
PIA_H //Share of publicly intermediated assets home
PIA_F //Share of publicly intermediated assets foreign
;
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% 2. Defining exogenous variables
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
varexo
tau_PNH // Policy instrument
tau_WNH // Policy instrument
e_Pref // Preference shock
e_Qual_F // Capital quality shock
e_Qual_H; // Capital quality shock
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% 3. Defining parameters
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
parameters
betta // Subjective discount rate
alppha // Effective capital share
h // Habit parameter
siggma // Relative risk aversion
gammmaaaH // Consumption share of tradable goods
gammmaaaF // Consumption share of tradable goods
rhho // Elasticity of substitution home and foreign tradables
varphi // Elasticity of substitution tradables -non -tradables
nu // Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
eps_T // Elasticity of substitution in tradable sector
eps_N // Elasticity of substitution in non -tradable sector
eps_W // Elasticity of substitution wages
xi // Probability of keeping prices fixed
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omegga //Share of home tradable consumption (home bias)
psi_infl // Taylor rule parameter
psi_B // Intermediation cost parameter in bond market (ensures stationarity)
R_nom_SS // Steady state nominal interest rate (gross)
chi // Proportional transfer to entering bankers
lambda // Fraction of capital that can be diverted by bankers
theta // Survivial rate of bankers
zeta // Elasticity of depreciation
etta // Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital
rho_Qual // Autoregression parameter (capital quality process)
rho_Pref // Autoregression parameter (Preference process)
tau_PIA // Efficiency cost of public intermediation in credit market
vu_PIA // Strength of feedback of credit policy wrt credit spreads
// Steady state parameters
delta // Steady state depreciation
delta_a // Parameter to fix steady state utilization
delta_b // Parameter to fix steady state utilization
PHI_SS // Steady state PHI
Rk_SS // Steady state return on capital
;
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------






























// Steady State parameters
R_nom_SS = 1/betta;
PHI_SS = (((-theta )* lambda + betta*theta*lambda - betta*chi + betta*theta*chi
+ sqrt ((-4)* betta*theta *(((- betta) + betta*theta ))* lambda*chi
+ (( theta*lambda - betta*theta*lambda + betta*chi - betta*theta*chi ))^2))
/(2* betta*theta*lambda*chi));
Rk_SS = (betta -theta+theta*PHI_SS -betta*PHI_SS*chi )/( betta*theta*PHI_SS );
delta = 0.025;
delta_b = (Rk_SS -1+ delta) ;







C_THH = omegga* (p_THH/p_TH)^(-rhho) * C_TH;
C_TFH = (1-omegga )* (p_TFF/p_TH)^(-rhho) * C_TH;
C_TFF = omegga* (p_TFF/p_TF)^(-rhho) * C_TF;
C_THF = (1-omegga )* (p_THH/p_TF)^(-rhho) * C_TF;
C_TH = gammmaaaH* (p_TH/p_H)^(- varphi) * C_H;
C_TF = gammmaaaF* (p_TF/p_F)^(- varphi) * C_F;
//Non -tradable
C_NHH = (1-gammmaaaH )* (p_NH/p_H)^(- varphi) * C_H;




((1-xi*Infl_TH ^(eps_T -1))/(1 -xi))^(1/(1 - eps_T )) = eps_T/(eps_T -1) * RHO_A_TH/RHO_B_TH;
RHO_A_TH = Y_TH * Pref * dU_dC_H * P_int_TH/p_H
+ betta*xi* (Infl_TH (+1))^( eps_T) *RHO_A_TH (+1);
RHO_B_TH = Y_TH * Pref * dU_dC_H * p_THH/p_H
+ betta*xi* (Infl_TH (+1))^( eps_T -1) *RHO_B_TH (+1);
//Home non -tradables
((1-xi*Infl_NH ^(eps_N -1))/(1 -xi))^(1/(1 - eps_N )) = eps_N/(eps_N -1) * RHO_A_NH/RHO_B_NH;
RHO_A_NH = Y_NH * Pref * dU_dC_H * P_int_NH/p_H
+ betta*xi* (Infl_NH (+1))^( eps_N) *RHO_A_NH (+1);
RHO_B_NH = Y_NH * Pref *(1- tau_PNH )* dU_dC_H * p_NH/p_H
+ betta*xi* (Infl_NH (+1))^( eps_N -1) *RHO_B_NH (+1);
// Foreign tradables
((1-xi*Infl_TF ^(eps_T -1))/(1 -xi))^(1/(1 - eps_T )) = eps_T/(eps_T -1) * RHO_A_TF/RHO_B_TF;
RHO_A_TF = Y_TF * Pref * dU_dC_F * P_int_TF/p_F
+ betta*xi* (Infl_TF (+1))^( eps_T) *RHO_A_TF (+1);
RHO_B_TF = Y_TF * Pref * dU_dC_F * p_TFF/p_F
+ betta*xi* (Infl_TF (+1))^( eps_T -1) *RHO_B_TF (+1);
// Foreign non -tradables
((1-xi*Infl_NF ^(eps_N -1))/(1 -xi))^(1/(1 - eps_N )) = eps_N/(eps_N -1) * RHO_A_NF/RHO_B_NF;
RHO_A_NF = Y_NF * Pref * dU_dC_F * P_int_NF/p_F
+ betta*xi* (Infl_NF (+1))^( eps_N) *RHO_A_NF (+1);
RHO_B_NF = Y_NF * Pref * dU_dC_F * p_NF/p_F
+ betta*xi* (Infl_NF (+1))^( eps_N -1) *RHO_B_NF (+1);
//WAGE SETTING
//Home
((1-xi*WInfl_H ^(eps_W -1))/(1 -xi ))^((1+ eps_W*nu)/(1- eps_W)) =
eps_W/(eps_W -1)* RHO_WA_H/RHO_WB_H;
RHO_WA_H = (L_H )^(1+ nu)* Pref
+ betta*xi* (WInfl_H (+1))^( eps_W *(1+nu)) *RHO_WA_H (+1);
RHO_WB_H = (1-tau_WNH )* dU_dC_H * Pref * W_H/p_H * (L_H)
+ betta*xi* (WInfl_H (+1))^( eps_W -1) *RHO_WB_H (+1);
// Foreign
((1-xi*WInfl_F ^(eps_W -1))/(1 -xi ))^((1+ eps_W*nu)/(1- eps_W)) =
eps_W/(eps_W -1)* RHO_WA_F/RHO_WB_F;
RHO_WA_F = (L_F )^(1+nu)* Pref
+ betta*xi* (WInfl_F (+1))^( eps_W *(1+nu)) *RHO_WA_F (+1);
RHO_WB_F = dU_dC_F * W_F/p_F * (L_F) * Pref
+ betta*xi* (WInfl_F (+1))^( eps_W -1) *RHO_WB_F (+1);
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//PRICE DISPERSION
Disp_TH = xi*Infl_TH^eps_T*Disp_TH (-1)
+ (1-xi)*((1-xi*Infl_TH ^(eps_T -1))/(1 -xi))^( eps_T /(eps_T -1));
Disp_NH = xi*Infl_NH^eps_N*Disp_NH (-1)
+ (1-xi)*((1-xi*Infl_NH ^(eps_N -1))/(1 -xi))^( eps_N /(eps_N -1));
Disp_TF = xi*Infl_TF^eps_T*Disp_TF (-1)
+ (1-xi)*((1-xi*Infl_TF ^(eps_T -1))/(1 -xi))^( eps_T /(eps_T -1));
Disp_NF = xi*Infl_NF^eps_N*Disp_NF (-1)
+ (1-xi)*((1-xi*Infl_NF ^(eps_N -1))/(1 -xi))^( eps_N /(eps_N -1));
// INFLATION
Infl_TH = p_THH/p_THH(-1) *Infl_MU;
Infl_NH = p_NH/p_NH(-1) *Infl_MU;
Infl_TF = p_TFF/p_TFF(-1) *Infl_MU;
Infl_NF = p_NF/p_NF(-1) *Infl_MU;
WInfl_H = W_H/W_H(-1)* Infl_MU;
WInfl_F = W_F/W_F(-1)* Infl_MU;
Infl_H = p_H/p_H(-1) * Infl_MU;
Infl_F = p_F/p_F(-1) * Infl_MU;
// OVERALL PRICE INDEX
// Tradables
p_TH = (omegga*p_THH^(1-rhho) + (1-omegga )* p_TFF^(1-rhho) )^(1/(1 - rhho ));
p_TF = (omegga*p_TFF^(1-rhho) + (1-omegga )* p_THH^(1-rhho) )^(1/(1 - rhho ));
// Consumper price index
p_H = (gammmaaaH*p_TH^(1- varphi) + (1-gammmaaaH )*p_NH^(1- varphi) )^(1/(1 - varphi ));
p_F = (gammmaaaF*p_TF^(1- varphi) + (1-gammmaaaF )*p_NF^(1- varphi) )^(1/(1 - varphi ));
// Monetary Union
p_H ^(1/2) = 1/p_F ^(1/2);
// OVERALL OUTPUT / GDP
Y_MU = Y_H ^(1/2)* Y_F ^(1/2);
Y_H = Y_TH + Y_NH;
Y_F = Y_TF + Y_NF;
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// HOUSEHOLDS
//First -order condition: Home
dU_dC_H = ((C_H -h*C_H(-1))^(- siggma) - betta*h*(C_H(+1)-h*C_H)^(- siggma ));
MRS_H = Pref*( dU_dC_H / dU_dC_H (-1));
NMRS_H = MRS_H / ( p_H/p_H(-1) * Infl_MU );
1 = psi_Bond* betta* R_nom * (NMRS_H (+1)) ;
//First -order condition: Foreign
dU_dC_F = ((C_F -h*C_F(-1))^(- siggma) - betta*h*(C_F(+1)-h*C_F)^(- siggma ));
MRS_F = Pref*( dU_dC_F / dU_dC_F (-1));
NMRS_F = MRS_F / ( p_F/p_F(-1) * Infl_MU );
1 = betta* R_nom * (NMRS_F (+1)) ;
// FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
//First -order condition: home
RHO_FA_H = (1-theta )* betta *(( NMRS_H (+1)))*( Rk_nom_H (+1)- R_nom)
+ betta *(( NMRS_H (+1)))* theta*(PHI_H (+1)/ PHI_H
* (( Rk_nom_H (+1)- R_nom )*PHI_H + R_nom ))* RHO_FA_H (+1);
RHO_FB_H = (1-theta) + betta *(( NMRS_H (+1)))* theta
* (( Rk_nom_H (+1)- R_nom )*PHI_H + R_nom )* RHO_FB_H (+1);
PHI_H = RHO_FB_H /(lambda -RHO_FA_H );
//First -order condition: foreign
RHO_FA_F = (1-theta )* betta *(( NMRS_F (+1)))*( Rk_nom_F (+1)- R_nom)
+ betta *(( NMRS_F (+1)))* theta*(PHI_F (+1)/ PHI_F
* (( Rk_nom_F (+1)- R_nom )*PHI_F + R_nom ))* RHO_FA_F (+1);
RHO_FB_F = (1-theta) + betta *(( NMRS_F (+1)))* theta
* (( Rk_nom_F (+1)- R_nom )*PHI_F + R_nom )* RHO_FB_F (+1);
PHI_F = RHO_FB_F /(lambda -RHO_FA_F );
// Demand for assets
PHI_H/(1-PIA_H)*N_H = Q_H*K_HH ;
PHI_F/(1-PIA_F)*N_F = Q_F*K_FF ;
// Evolution of bankers net worth
N_H = theta *(( Rk_nom_H -R_nom (-1))* PHI_H (-1)+ R_nom ( -1))* N_H(-1)
+ chi * (Q_H*K_HH (-1)) ;
N_F = theta *(( Rk_nom_F -R_nom (-1))* PHI_F (-1)+ R_nom ( -1))* N_F(-1)
+ chi * (Q_F*K_FF (-1)) ;
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// INTERMEDIATE GOODS FIRMS
YD_TH = Y_TH*Disp_TH ;
YD_NH = Y_NH*Disp_NH ;
YD_TF = Y_TF*Disp_TF ;
YD_NF = Y_NF*Disp_NF ;
// Production Functions: Home and foreign , tradables and non -tradables
YD_TH = (U_H*Qual_H*K_HH ( -1))^( alppha) * L_TH^(1- alppha );
YD_NH = L_NH^(1- alppha );
YD_TF = (U_F*Qual_F*K_FF ( -1))^( alppha) * L_TF^(1- alppha );
YD_NF = L_NF^(1- alppha );
// Optimal labor
W_H = P_int_TH * (1-alppha )*YD_TH/L_TH ;
W_H = P_int_NH * (1-alppha )*YD_NH/L_NH ;
W_F = P_int_TF * (1-alppha )*YD_TF/L_TF ;
W_F = P_int_NF * (1-alppha )*YD_NF/L_NF ;
L_H = L_NH + L_TH;
L_F = L_NF + L_TF;
// Optimal capital utilization
YD_TH*P_int_TH = p_THH *( (delta_b *U_H^zeta) *U_H *Qual_H *(K_HH (-1)) )/ alppha;
YD_TF*P_int_TF = p_TFF *( (delta_b *U_F^zeta) *U_F *Qual_F *(K_FF (-1)) )/ alppha;
// CAPITAL PRODUCING FIRMS
//First order condition: Capital producing firm
Q_H = p_THH+ p_THH *etta /2*(( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS )/( I_HH_net (-1)+ I_HH_SS) -1)^2
+ p_THH*( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS )/( I_HH_net (-1)+ I_HH_SS)
* etta *(( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS )/( I_HH_net (-1)+ I_HH_SS) -1)
- betta *(( NMRS_H (+1)))* p_THH (+1)*(( I_HH_net (+1)+ I_HH_SS )/( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS ))^2
* etta *((( I_HH_net (+1)+ I_HH_SS )/( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS )) -1);
Q_F = p_TFF+ p_TFF *etta /2*(( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS )/( I_FF_net (-1)+ I_FF_SS) -1)^2
+ p_TFF*( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS )/( I_FF_net (-1)+ I_FF_SS)
* etta *(( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS )/( I_FF_net (-1)+ I_FF_SS) -1)
- betta *(( NMRS_F (+1)))* p_TFF (+1)*(( I_FF_net (+1)+ I_FF_SS )/( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS ))^2
* etta *((( I_FF_net (+1)+ I_FF_SS )/( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS )) -1);
// CAPITAL
// Evolution of capital
K_HH = Qual_H*K_HH(-1) + I_HH_net;
K_FF = Qual_F*K_FF(-1) + I_FF_net;
159
// Investment
I_HH_net = I_HH - (delta_a + delta_b /(1+ zeta)*U_H ^(1+ zeta ))* Qual_H*K_HH (-1);
I_FF_net = I_FF - (delta_a + delta_b /(1+ zeta)*U_F ^(1+ zeta ))* Qual_F*K_FF (-1);
I_HH_SS = steady_state(I_HH);
I_FF_SS = steady_state(I_FF);
// Nominal return on capital
Rk_nom_H = (( P_int_TH * alppha*YD_TH/( Qual_H *(K_HH (-1)))
+ Q_H - (delta_a + delta_b /(1+ zeta)*U_H ^(1+ zeta ))* p_THH )* Qual_H) /Q_H(-1) ;
Rk_nom_F = (( P_int_TF * alppha*YD_TF/( Qual_F *(K_FF (-1)))
+ Q_F - (delta_a + delta_b /(1+ zeta)*U_F ^(1+ zeta ))* p_TFF )* Qual_F) /Q_F(-1) ;
// RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
Y_TH = C_THH + C_THF + I_HH
+ etta /2*(( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS )/( I_HH_net (-1)+ I_HH_SS) -1)^2*( I_HH_net+I_HH_SS)
+ tau_PIA*PIA_H*Q_H*K_HH;
Y_TF = C_TFH + C_TFF + I_FF
+ etta /2*(( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS )/( I_FF_net (-1)+ I_FF_SS) -1)^2*( I_FF_net+I_FF_SS)
+ tau_PIA*PIA_F*Q_F*K_FF;
Y_NH = C_NHH ;
Y_NF = C_NFF;
// EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN ASSETS
B_H/psi_Bond = R_nom (-1)/ Infl_MU * B_H(-1) + p_THH*C_THF - p_TFF*C_TFH;
B_H + B_F = 0;
psi_Bond = exp(-psi_B*B_H/(p_H*(C_THH+C_THF+C_NHH ))) ;
// CENTRAL BANK RULES
// Taylor rule
//R_nom = R_nom_SS*Infl_MU^psi_infl;
R_nom = max (1.0025 , R_nom_SS*Infl_MU^psi_infl );
// Credit policy
PIA_H = vu_PIA * ( (Rk_nom_H (+1) - R_nom) - (Rk_SS - R_nom_SS) );
PIA_F = vu_PIA * ( (Rk_nom_F (+1) - R_nom) - (Rk_SS - R_nom_SS) );
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// STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
// Quality of capital
log(Qual_H) = rho_Qual*log(Qual_H (-1)) - e_Qual_H;
log(Qual_F) = rho_Qual*log(Qual_F (-1)) - e_Qual_F;
// Preferences
log(Pref) = rho_Pref*log(Pref (-1)) + e_Pref;
end;
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




















































































































































































































































var e_Qual_H; periods 1;
values 0.05;
var e_Qual_F; periods 1;
values 0.05;
//var e_Pref; periods 1;
// values 0.0025;
end;
simul(periods =100, maxit =100);
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